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BLINDED BY THE LIGHT: INFORMATION 
OVERLOAD AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR 
SECURITIES REGULATION 
TROY A. PAREDES* 
“Then too, there is the recurrent theme throughout [the federal 
securities laws] of disclosure, again disclosure, and still more 
disclosure. Substantive regulation has its limits. But ‘the truth shall 
make you free.’” 
1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 29 (3d 
ed. rev. 1998) 
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial 
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light 
the most efficient policeman.” 
LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE 
BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most hotly-contested debate in the history of securities 
regulation has been over the need for mandatory disclosure. Scholars in the 
field of securities regulation have argued both sides of the debate for years. 
But as a matter of positive law, the debate has been settled for decades, with 
mandatory disclosure winning the day. A demanding system of mandatory 
disclosure, which has become more demanding in the aftermath of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,1 makes up the core of the federal securities 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. Special thanks are owed 
to Alan Beller, Chris Bracey, Kathy Brickey, Randy Calvert, Steve Choi, Jim Cox, Merritt Fox, Chris 
Guthrie, Chris Hanaway, Dan Keating, Scott Kieff, Ron King, Kim Krawiec, Bob Lawless, Jonathan 
Macey, Frank Partnoy, Nancy Pechloff, Ed Rock, Hillary Sale, Steve Schwarcz, Joel Seligman, and 
Peter Wiedenbeck for very helpful discussions and comments during the writing of this Article. 
Special thanks are owed to John Bachmann and Jim Cheek for being my symposium commentators. I 
would also like to thank Melissa Cover, Keith Edelstein, Joe Guerrini, and Mahesh Joshi (all 
Washington University School of Law class of 2003) for their great research assistance. All remaining 
mistakes, of course, are mine.  
 1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinafter 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act]. 
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laws. The federal securities laws require companies to make extensive 
disclosures in annual reports, quarterly reports, current reports, proxy 
statements, and other filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Disclosure is designed to solve the informational asymmetries that exist 
between companies and investors. The logic is that by arming investors with 
information, mandatory disclosure promotes informed investor decision 
making, capital market integrity, and capital market efficiency. Once they are 
empowered with information, the argument goes, investors can protect 
themselves against corporate abuses and mismanagement, and there is no 
need for the government to engage in more substantive securities 
regulation—merit review in the parlance.  
Securities regulation is motivated, in large part, by the assumption that 
more information is better than less. Perhaps this is no surprise since the 
SEC’s chief regulatory tool is to require companies to disclose more. If the 
SEC did not call for more disclosure in the wake of corporate scandal and 
fraud, as it has done following recent events at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, 
Adelphia, and elsewhere, it would be able to do relatively little, other than sit 
on the sidelines and let other regulators and policy makers take the lead. 
Indeed, today, companies are required to disclose more information than 
ever, and the SEC continues to adopt new disclosure requirements. 
Two things are needed for the federal securities laws, or any disclosure-
based regulatory regime, to be effective. The first is straightforward: 
information has to be disclosed. The second is equally straightforward, but 
often overlooked. That is, the users of the information—for example, 
investors, securities analysts, brokers, and money managers—need to use the 
disclosed information effectively. The federal securities laws primarily focus 
on the former—mandating disclosure. Relatively little attention is paid to 
how the information is used—namely, how investors and securities market 
professionals search and process information and make decisions based on 
the information the federal securities laws make available. In short, if the 
users do not process information effectively, it is not clear what good 
mandating disclosure does.  
The federal securities laws generally assume that investors and other 
securities market participants are perfectly rational, from which it follows 
that more disclosure is always better than less. However, investors and other 
market participants are not perfectly rational.2 Herbert Simon was among the 
 2. To be clear at the outset, in referring to “investors” throughout this Article, I am referring not 
only to individual (i.e., “retail”) investors, but to professional traders and institutional investors, as 
well as the analysts, brokers, and other securities market professionals who make up securities 
markets. However, since the professionals are particularly important to capital market efficiency and 
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first to point out that people are boundedly rational,3 and numerous studies 
have since supported Simon’s claim.4 Simon recognized that people have 
limited cognitive abilities to process information.5 As a result, people tend to 
economize on cognitive effort when making decisions by adopting heuristics 
or “short cuts.” In Simon’s terms, when faced with complicated tasks, people 
tend to “satisfice” rather than “optimize.”6  
What does this have to do with mandatory disclosure and securities 
regulation? A task is said to become more complicated as it involves the 
processing of more and more information—as the task size increases. Studies 
show that at some point, people become overloaded with information and 
make worse decisions than if less information were made available to them.7 
The concept of information overload builds on Simon’s insight that people 
satisfice. In particular, studies show that when faced with complicated tasks 
that involve vast quantities of information, people tend to adopt simplifying 
decision strategies that require less cognitive effort, but that are less accurate 
than more complex decision strategies.8 The net result of having access to 
more information, combined with using a less accurate decision strategy as 
the information load increases, is often an inferior decision. In other words, 
people might make better decisions by bringing a more complex decision 
strategy to bear on less information than by bringing a simpler decision 
strategy to bear on more information. Borrowing Brandeis’ terminology, in 
addition to being a disinfectant, sunlight can also be blinding. 
To the extent that investors, analysts, and other securities market 
participants are subject to information overload, the model of mandatory 
disclosure that says more is better than less is incomplete and may be 
counterproductive.9 It is incomplete because it ignores how the disclosed 
information is used. And it is potentially counterproductive because the 
provocative implication of information overload is that the federal mandatory 
disclosure system might be more effective if it were scaled back—that is to 
say, if less were disclosed, not more.  
the pricing of securities, and since they presumably can search and process information more 
effectively than individual investors can, I specifically address the extent to which these expert 
“filters” might be subject to information overload in infra Part IV.B.1. 
 3. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
 4. See, e.g., infra notes 82, 90, 125-26. 
 5. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text. 
 9. This Article’s focus is information overload. There are other aspects of investor psychology 
and decision making that have implications for securities regulation. See infra notes 125-26, 128.  
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Many questions need to be answered before significantly scaling back 
disclosure obligations. The most important question is whether or not 
investors are, in fact, overloaded. Even if individual investors are overloaded, 
what about the expert “filters” the federal securities laws primarily rely on to 
search and interpret information? Further, if the SEC were to delete certain 
disclosure requirements, which ones? Everybody does not use the same 
information.  
The tone of this Article and its policy suggestions are necessarily 
tentative. The concerns about information overload expressed here are part of 
a larger trend considering how our growing understanding of investor 
psychology and behavioral finance might impact securities regulation. Before 
arguing for major regulatory reform, there is still much to be learned about 
information overload and about investor psychology and behavioral finance 
generally.10 Indeed, I ultimately call for more empirical research to better 
understand how investors process information and make investment 
decisions. My goal here is to highlight that information overload is a real 
concern that should not be ignored. 
Whether or not the SEC is, or ever will be, prepared to cut back 
disclosure requirements meaningfully, the federal securities laws could be 
improved by accounting for how investors actually process information and 
make decisions. At the very least, the specter of information overload casts 
doubt on the long-held belief and policy choice that more disclosure is better 
than less. I am confident that a more effective disclosure system can be 
developed once we have a better understanding of how investors, analysts, 
and others respond to information. This holds not only for information 
overload, but for other aspects of investor psychology, including the various 
cognitive biases at the core of behavioral finance. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the federal mandatory 
disclosure system, focusing on how disclosure obligations have expanded 
over the years. Part III discusses the concept of information overload, 
beginning with bounded rationality and then continuing with a discussion of 
more modern decision theory. Part IV considers the implications of 
information overload for securities regulation. After raising the possibility of 
scaling back mandatory disclosure requirements, I address a number of 
concerns that a more lax disclosure regime might raise. Next, Part V 
discusses what regulatory steps, if any, should be taken at this time in 
response to the risk of information overload. Part V also offers a few 
 10. See generally Jennifer Arlen, Comment: The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of 
Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765 (1998) [hereinafter Arlen]. 
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thoughts on what information overload means for the efficient capital market 
hypothesis, a key feature of the mandatory disclosure system. Part VI 
concludes. 
II. OUR MANDATORY DISCLOSURE SYSTEM 
One of the most intense and long-standing debates in securities law is 
over the need for a federal system of mandatory disclosure.11 Although the 
debate has taken on various forms over the years, the key arguments for and 
against mandatory disclosure can be easily summarized. Critics of mandatory 
disclosure argue that a company will voluntarily disclose information that 
investors demand in order to reduce its cost of capital and avoid any discount 
that the market might apply to the company’s stock price if investors think 
that they have too little information to evaluate the company and its securities 
properly or, worse yet, if investors think that the company is hiding 
something.12 Supporters of mandatory disclosure counter that because 
information has public good aspects, voluntary disclosure will result in too 
little disclosure.13 Further, because investors, securities analysts, brokers, and 
other securities market professionals do not internalize all the benefits of 
information they gather and analyze, they will invest too few resources in 
research and analysis. Mandatory disclosure, in effect, subsidizes research 
and analysis. At the same time, to the extent investors, securities analysts, 
and others do search out key information, mandatory disclosure reduces the 
wasteful transaction costs that result when multiple parties track down the 
same information. In addition, companies might have an incentive to 
 11. The literature on mandatory disclosure is voluminous. Some of the leading works include 
HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC 
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979) [hereinafter KRIPKE]; 
George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973) [hereinafter Benston]; John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 
(1984) [hereinafter Coffee]; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel]; Edmund W. 
Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995) [hereinafter 
Kitch]; Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. 
L. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Seligman, Historical Need]; George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the 
Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964). 
 12. Homer Kripke explains it this way: “A disclosure will be supplied voluntarily by issuers 
interested in the capital markets when there is a consensus among suppliers of capital or other 
transactors in the capital market that this information is necessary to them for lending and investment 
decisions. Issuers will supply it because the alternative is to forego access to the capital markets.” 
KRIPKE, supra note 11, at 119. 
 13. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 11, at 723-37; Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: 
Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1342-68 (1999). 
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withhold competitively sensitive or proprietary information in order to keep 
it out of their competitors’ hands. Finally, even if companies have an 
incentive to disclose good news, managers may have an incentive to 
withhold negative information in the hope that things will turn around for the 
company or that the market otherwise will not uncover the bad news. The 
incentive to disclose negative information might be weakest when the issuer 
or its managers are facing a final period.14  
As a regulatory matter, the mandatory disclosure debate has been settled 
for seventy years, since the Securities Act of 1933 was adopted. Our federal 
securities laws are designed to protect investors and the integrity of capital 
markets by mandating disclosure that enables informed investor decision 
making, boosts investor confidence, and reduces agency costs.15 In 
developing the federal mandatory disclosure system, Congress has eschewed 
 14. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities 
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (1992); Mitu Gulati, When Corporate 
Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 675, 705-09 (1999). 
 The most recent iteration of the mandatory disclosure debate is issuer choice, which has a distinct 
international focus given our increasingly global capital markets. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew 
T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1855 (1997); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: 
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Stephen 
J. Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000); 
Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. 
L. REV. 2498 (1997); Merritt B. Fox, The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, 78 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 567 (2000); Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563 (2001); 
Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997) [hereinafter Mahoney]; 
Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 
2359 (1998); Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001). Advocates of issuer choice contend that issuers should have a 
choice among competing regulatory regimes. Specifically, issuers should be able to choose between 
the securities law regime of the federal government, any state, or any foreign country. Another 
possibility is for stock exchanges to have regulatory authority. The basic argument is that investors can 
evaluate competing regulatory regimes, in addition to an issuer’s fundamentals. Not all issuers are the 
same and not all investors are the same. Different issuers and investors have different preferences for 
disclosure and enforcement regimes. Regulatory competition will result in more choice among 
securities law systems, and issuers and investors will segregate themselves as each sees fit. Such a 
market-based approach to securities regulation is said to empower investors by giving them more 
investment alternatives. Critics of issuer choice respond on two principal fronts. First, voluntary 
disclosure, whether in the context of issuer choice or otherwise, leads to suboptimal disclosure of 
information. Second, regulatory competition in securities law will lead to a “race to the bottom,” 
resulting in ineffective regulatory regimes and inadequate investor protection. 
 
 15. See, e.g., Benston, supra note 11, at 134, 136-37; Donald C. Langevoort, Information 
Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 763-64 (1985) 
[hereinafter Langevoort, Information Technology]; Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social 
Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 987-94 (1992) [hereinafter Kahan]; A.A. 
Sommer, Jr., Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 263, 263-65 (1976) [hereinafter Sommer]; 
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission 305 
(1977) [hereinafter SEC Advisory Committee Report]; see also infra Part IV.B.3. 
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a regulatory regime in which some arm of the government, such as an expert 
administrative agency like the Securities and Exchange Commission, makes 
investment decisions for individuals or otherwise allocates our economy’s 
financial capital, for example by passing judgment on the merits of securities 
offerings or on companies more broadly.16 Instead, the disclosure regime of 
the federal securities laws is designed to disseminate information to 
investors, who in turn use this information in making investment decisions—
both good ones and bad ones.17  
 16. Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: 
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (Mar. 31, 2003) 
(written statement of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission), at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032102tshlp.htm (explaining that Congress “rejected a ‘merit-
based’ system of regulation”) [hereinafter Pitt, Written Testimony]. For a general discussion of merit 
review, see 1 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 114-25 (3d ed. rev. 1998) 
[hereinafter 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN]. 
 17. The SEC has explained the philosophy of disclosure as follows: “[A] disclosure law would 
provide the best protection for investors. In other words, if the investor had available to him all the 
material facts concerning a security, he would then be in a position to make an informed judgment 
whether or not to buy.” Adoption of Rule 144, Securities Act Release No. 33-5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 591, 
592 (Jan. 11, 1972). See also Pitt, Written Testimony, supra note 16, at 5 (“We believe it is important 
to maintain a disclosure-based regulatory system that relies on capital allocation decisions made by 
market participants.”). Disclosure also facilitates shareholders’ exercise of their franchise under 
corporation law, as well as of their right to sue directors and officers, such as for breach of fiduciary 
duty.  
 Taking this emphasis on disclosure seriously, the Supreme Court, as well as numerous lower 
courts, has largely limited the reach of the federal securities laws and the SEC’s jurisdiction to 
disclosure-related matters. Courts have also sought to avoid federalizing corporate law, which has 
traditionally been left to the states. For example, in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 
(1977), the Supreme Court held that a fiduciary duty breach, without any deception, misrepresentation, 
or nondisclosure, does not constitute fraud under Rule 10b-5. Mere instances of corporate 
mismanagement or fiduciary duty breach are generally outside the reach of the federal securities laws, 
but are properly left to state corporation law to address. Id. at 478 (explaining that the “fundamental 
purpose” of the federal securities laws is to implement a “philosophy of full disclosure” and that the 
fairness of the terms of a transaction are “at most a tangential concern”) (citation omitted); see also 
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that “manipulation” under § 14(e) 
of the Exchange Act requires deception and that § 14(e) does not regulate the substantive fairness of 
takeover defensive tactics adopted by a target company). Similarly, the Second Circuit held in 
Business Roundtable v. S.E.C., 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), that the SEC did not have the authority 
to promulgate Rule 19c-4, the “one-share/one-vote” rule, because the rule regulated the allocation of 
authority among shareholders and was unrelated to disclosure. See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in 
Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
687 (1986). These cases draw a line between matters of corporate governance and matters of 
disclosure. Although matters of disclosure generally fall within the scope of the federal securities laws, 
whereas the substantive regulation of corporate governance is principally left to state corporation law, 
features of the federal securities law do impact corporate governance. For example, the federal 
securities laws regulate proxies, shareholder proposals, and tender offer bids. Moreover, disclosure 
itself can indirectly affect corporate governance. See infra notes 211-32 and accompanying text. 
Further, failure to disclose a fiduciary duty breach may itself constitute fraud under the federal 
securities laws. See Donald C. Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit 
of Managerial Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449 (2001). For a general discussion of the extent to 
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The federal mandatory disclosure regime today cannot be understood 
without considering the efficient capital market hypothesis (“ECMH”).18 
According to the ECMH, capital markets are efficient in that security prices 
reflect available information.19 The federal securities laws promote market 
efficiency by requiring that information be made available to the market for 
investment decisions. The ECMH has profoundly influenced financial 
economics and the recent development and enforcement of the federal 
securities laws. Some of the more significant securities law developments 
based on the ECMH include integrated disclosure, shelf registrations under 
Rule 415 of the Exchange Act, and the fraud-on-the-market theory of 
reliance under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.20  
Companies tell us more today than ever. Merrill Lynch, for example, 
recently looked at Form 10-K filings for 2001 and reported a “surge” in the 
size of 2001 10-K filings, as measured in kilobytes.21 In particular, Merrill 
Lynch found that the median growth rate in the size of Form 10-Ks from 
2000 to 2001 for the sample of companies in its study was 36%.22 And there 
is at least anecdotal evidence suggesting, as might be expected, that SEC 
filings by public companies have continued to grow since. 
Increasing disclosure by companies is in part the result of technological 
advances, such as the Internet, which greatly facilitate the dissemination of 
which the federal securities laws regulate corporate governance, notwithstanding the Supreme Court 
cases that more narrowly construe the SEC’s authority, see Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in 
Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227, 245-63 
(1998); Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting 
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (1999); Mark J. Roe, 
Delaware’s Competition (Aug. 2003), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID354783_ 
code021202630.pdf?abstractid=354783; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as 
Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003) [hereinafter 
Thompson & Sale]. 
 18. For more on the ECMH, see infra Part V.B. 
 19. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 
J. FIN. 383 (1970) [hereinafter Fama]; Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 
(1991); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 549 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman]. For a more extensive discussion of the ECMH, see 
infra Part V.B. 
 20. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market 
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 872-912 (1992) [hereinafter Langevoort, Market 
Efficiency Revisited] (critiquing ECMH as a basis for such features of securities regulation); Lynn A. 
Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and 
Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 619-40, 696-706 (1988) [hereinafter Stout, 
Unimportance of Being Efficient]; Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, 
Costly Information and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 796-824 (1985) [hereinafter 
Gordon & Kornhauser]. 
 21. Merrill Lynch, TechStrat Barometer, Weekly Wisdom for Technology Investors (Apr. 26, 
2002).  
 22. Id. 
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information to more people more quickly than ever.23 But it is also the result 
of expanded disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws. 
Disclosure obligations have increased over the years. A detailed item-by-
item analysis of the evolution of disclosure obligations is beyond this 
Article’s scope, but a few observations are worth making.24  
The starting point for appreciating how extensive disclosure requirements 
are is Regulation S-K. Regulation S-K provides for wide-ranging disclosure 
of both quantitative and qualitative information with respect to such matters 
as a registrant’s business development and prospects, legal proceedings, 
properties, financial performance, directors and officers, and securities.25 All 
told, Regulation S-K provides for the disclosure of approximately fifty items. 
The instructions to Regulation S-K require very detailed and extensive 
disclosures in each case.  
One of the most important textual disclosures is Management’s 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 
(Item 303, Regulation S-K).26 The origins of MD&A date back to 1968, 
although the formal MD&A requirement was not adopted until 1980.27 
MD&A requires a reporting company to discuss its liquidity, capital 
resources, results of operations, and any other information the registrant 
believes is necessary to understand its financial condition and results of 
operations over the previous three years. Until the early 1970s, the SEC 
generally prohibited registrants from including projections in their filings.28 
MD&A marked a notable shift in this policy. MD&A, for example, requires 
the disclosure of certain known changes, trends, or uncertainties relating to 
 23. For more on the Internet and securities regulation, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 141-61 (9th ed. 2003); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 
1195 (1997); Symposium, Regulation of Securities and Securities Exchanges in the Age of the 
Internet, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2002). 
 24. For a similar overview of disclosure requirements, see Thompson & Sale, supra note 17, at 
869-86. Adding to the additional disclosure requirements described below for reporting companies, the 
SEC recently adopted a rule requiring mutual funds to disclose how they vote their proxies and to 
make available to shareholders the proxy votes they actually cast. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting 
Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-8188, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Jan. 31, 2003). 
 25. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. 229.10-229.702 (2003). 
 26. Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2003); see generally 2 LOUIS LOSS & 
JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 688-98 (3d ed. rev. 1999). 
 27. Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Securities Act Release No. 33-
4936, 33 Fed. Reg. 18,617 (Dec. 9, 1968); Notice of Adoption and Amendments to Guide 22 of the 
Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, Securities Act Release No. 33-5520, 39 
Fed. Reg. 31,894 (Aug. 14, 1974); Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, 
Regulations and Guides, Securities Act Release No. 33-6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 2, 1980). 
 28. See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 11, at 777-78. 
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the registrant’s business and financial condition, such as those that could 
have a material impact on net sales, revenues, or income from operations. 
Registrants are also encouraged to disclose other forward-looking 
information. To this end, Congress adopted a safe harbor under the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for forward-looking 
statements as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.29 
The shift in SEC emphasis toward textual disclosures has led to a significant 
increase in disclosure.30  
Another key disclosure item, which has received a lot of attention 
recently, is executive compensation. The SEC extensively revised its 
executive compensation disclosure requirements (Item 402, Regulation S-K) 
in 1992.31 Perhaps the most important change calls for much more detailed 
disclosures regarding non-cash and deferred executive compensation, such as 
stock options, restricted stock grants, long-term incentive plans, and stock 
appreciation rights.32 The board’s compensation committee must also 
disclose its general policies for setting executive compensation, the 
relationship of corporate performance to executive compensation, and the 
bases for the CEO’s compensation. The regulations further require a 
registrant’s compensation committee to explain any decision to reprice 
options or stock appreciation rights.33 Finally, to indicate how well 
management is (or is not) running the business, a registrant must provide a 
line graph comparing the registrant’s cumulative total shareholder return with 
market and industry indexes for five years.34  
The financial media also have a role to play in the mandatory disclosure 
system. The financial media, at least as they exist today, are a relatively 
recent phenomenon, but with significant influence. The media, in effect, are a 
multiplier of information, extending the reach of information disclosed by 
companies in SEC filings and press releases and adding layers of analysis to 
the “raw” information.  
 29. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1994 & Supp. I 1995)) (adding Sec. Act § 27A and Sec. 
Ex. Act. § 21E).  
 30. See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving 
Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 692 (1995) (explaining the 
“significant expansion in what must be disclosed” under the federal securities laws).  
 31. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 
48,125 (Oct. 16, 1992).  
 32. Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 228.402(b) (2003); Instrs. to Item 402(b), 17 
C.F.R. § 228.402; see also Items 402(c), (d), and (e) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 228.402(c)-(e), & 
Instrs. to Items 402(c), (d), and (e), 17 C.F.R. § 228.402. 
 33. Item 402(i) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 228.402(i). 
 34. Item 402(1) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 228.402(1). 
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Disclosure is the SEC’s chief regulatory tool. When the SEC has veered 
in the past toward more substantive regulation of corporate governance, the 
courts have often blocked its path.35 The fact that the regulatory devices 
available to the SEC in the corporate governance area are limited suggests 
that disclosure requirements will continue to increase as the SEC responds to 
new concerns that threaten our capital markets.36 The SEC’s response to 
Enron, WorldCom, and other recent corporate and accounting scandals is a 
case in point. Take current reports filed on Form 8-K. The SEC has proposed 
several new Form 8-K filing requirements, accelerating an already-existing 
trend toward a system of more continuous disclosure on a “real-time” basis 
as a way of ensuring the timeliness and accuracy of information provided to 
investors.37 For example, the SEC has proposed adding eleven new items that 
must be filed on Form 8-K38 and plans to expand current disclosure 
requirements with respect to the departure, removal, and election of directors 
and the departure and appointment of new officers.39 A company would also 
be required to disclose material changes to its articles of incorporation or 
bylaws.40 These proposed rule changes are projected to result in 
approximately 26,400 more filings per year with a price tag of over 
$80,000,000.41 Finally, the SEC separately has proposed requiring companies 
to file current reports describing certain insider transactions in company 
securities and insider loans.42 This new disclosure requirement is itself 
expected to result in over 215,000 additional Form 8-K filings each year at an 
annual cost of over $89,500,000.43 
MD&A is another area where disclosures are expanding post-Enron. 
Many believe that an expanded MD&A can go a long way toward remedying 
 35. See supra note 17. 
 36. It is, however, worth noting that a key feature of the SEC’s regulatory response in Enron’s 
wake was the Public Accounting Board, which very well might have gone into effect if not rendered 
irrelevant by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board provided for in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.  
 37. See, e.g., Pitt, Written Testimony, supra note 16, at 35 (citing goal of “real-time” disclosure). 
Importantly, “real-time” disclosure reduces the gap between what management knows and what 
investors know at any particular moment. 
 38. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, Securities 
Act Release No. 33-8106, 77 SEC Docket 2579 (June 17, 2002) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8106]. 
The SEC also proposes moving two items from other Exchange Act reports to Form 8-K: disclosures 
regarding unregistered sales of equity securities by the registrant and material modifications to the 
rights of holders of the company’s securities. Id.  
 39. Release No. 33-8106, at 21.  
 40. Id. at 24. 
 41. Id. at 36. 
 42. Form 8-K Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8090, 77 SEC Docket 1072 (Apr. 12, 2002). 
 43. Id. at 22. 
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the shortcomings in our mandatory disclosure regime that contributed to the 
recent corporate and accounting scandals. To be sure, MD&A has 
substantially improved the overall quality of disclosure by requiring 
management to give its take on the company’s past performance and future 
prospects.44 It is hard to imagine an investor who would prefer not to know 
management’s view of the company, assuming, of course, that 
management’s MD&A disclosures are truthful and accurate. The SEC is 
presently considering a number of changes to MD&A with the goal of further 
improving the transparency of financial disclosures, and so far it has 
proposed expanding disclosure requirements in two areas: (1) accounting 
estimates a company makes in applying its accounting policies; and (2) the 
initial adoption of accounting policies that have a material impact on a 
company’s financial presentation.45 As required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
the SEC has already adopted rules calling for more disclosure in MD&A 
regarding off-balance sheet transactions and certain contractual obligations 
and contingent liabilities and commitments.46 
Like the SEC, Congress has recently advocated real-time disclosure.47 
Further, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enacts a number of new disclosure 
requirements, implemented in many cases by the SEC rules described above, 
including new disclosures relating to the following: off-balance sheet 
transactions;48 reconciliations of pro-forma financial information with the 
registrant’s financial condition and results of operation;49 insider stock 
transactions;50 internal control systems;51 codes of ethics for senior financial 
officers;52 the audit committee’s financial expert;53 and CEO and CFO 
certifications of financial statements.54  
 44. See Concept Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and 
Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33-6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 17, 1987) 
(explaining that MD&A gives investors a chance to “look at the company through the eyes of 
management”). 
 45. Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About the Application of Critical 
Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 33-8098, 77 SEC Docket 1631 (May 10, 2002). 
 46. Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 33-8182, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 5982 (Jan. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Release No. 33-8182]. 
 47. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 1, § 409. 
 48. Id. § 401. 
 49. Id. § 401. 
 50. Id. § 403. 
 51. Id. § 404. 
 52. Id. § 406. 
 53. Id. § 407. 
 54. Id. §§ 302 & 906. For SEC final rules implementing a number of the disclosure requirements 
mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-8176, 68 Fed. Reg. 4820 (Jan. 22, 2003); Disclosure Required by 
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Companies will disclose more information if the law requires them to. 
But even without new disclosure mandates from the SEC or Congress, other 
forces are at work that will lead to more disclosure, at least in the near term. 
Two forces in particular come to mind. The first is the risk of liability for 
failure to disclose, which is to say for fraud. The risk of liability, or at least 
the perceived risk of liability, has increased since Enron’s demise. Not only 
did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act enact a plethora of new criminal and civil 
penalties for fraud,55 but the likelihood of being caught and prosecuted has 
increased. The Department of Justice and United States Attorneys around the 
country have been focusing on corporate fraud like never before. The SEC, 
in addition, has redoubled its efforts to ferret out and prosecute those who 
violate the federal securities laws,56 and the SEC’s significantly increased 
budget will help in the effort.57 Further, state attorneys general, most notably 
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, have been active to an 
unprecedented degree in bringing or threatening charges for fraud or 
corporate corruption against corporate executives, financial firms on Wall 
Street, and securities market professionals. All of this takes place against a 
new backdrop of “perp walks,” indictments, convictions, and guilty pleas. It 
is fair to surmise that recent high-profile cases involving executives at Enron, 
WorldCom, Adelphia, ImClone, and elsewhere have made the risks and 
consequences of engaging in fraud or other acts of corporate misconduct real 
to executives and directors around the country. A shift in bias toward 
disclosure seems to be taking place, especially for companies with nothing to 
hide. Instead of asking, “Why disclose?”, the question may be, “Why not 
disclose?”58  
Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 33-8177, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 5110 (Jan. 23, 2003); Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-47,225, 68 Fed. Reg. 4338 (Jan. 22, 2003); Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ 
Quarterly and Annual Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33-8124, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276 (Sept. 9, 
2002); Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-46,421, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,462 (Aug. 27, 2002); Release No. 33-8182, 
supra note 46.  
 55. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 1, at Titles VII, IX, & XI. 
 56. See, e.g., Michael Schroeder and Greg Ip, Imperfect Guardian: SEC Faces Hurdles Beyond 
Low Budget in Stopping Fraud, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A1 (explaining the significant increase 
in SEC enforcement actions brought in 2002). 
 57. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes $776 million for the SEC’s budget. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
supra note 1, § 601. The SEC’s budget for 2004 is expected to be $842 million. See, e.g., Deborah 
Solomon, New SEC Chief’s Top Priority: Rebuilding Trust in Watchdog, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2003, at 
A1. 
 58. Anecdotally, lawyers have suggested to me that companies often disclose information not to 
better inform investors, but to reduce the risk of liability for omitting a material fact or disclosing a 
“half truth.”  
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There is another reason companies are disclosing more. The capital 
markets demand better information these days. Securities market participants 
are focusing on the quality of disclosure in a way that they have not for years, 
if ever. The market is much quicker to punish a company if questions are 
raised about the company’s transparency and whether it has something to 
hide. Even securities analysts, who until recently rarely issued a “sell” or 
even a “hold” recommendation, seem to be more skeptical in the post-Enron 
world and are taking a harder look at companies. Many companies are 
responding by voluntarily disclosing more information before concerns 
arise.59 This is the very result that opponents of the mandatory disclosure 
system would predict.60 General Electric is just one company volunteering to 
disclose more information. GE has long been criticized for how it discloses 
information, especially with respect to its GE Capital business unit.61 
Responding to the desire of the capital markets for more transparency, in 
2002 GE announced that it would provide more detailed disclosures.62 In 
particular, GE said that it would disclose financial information for 26 
business segments, up from 12 segments, and would disclose additional 
information about 14 of the 25 businesses that make up GE Capital.63 Jeffrey 
Immelt, GE’s CEO and chairman, said the following about his company’s 
new approach to disclosure: “I want people to think about GE as we think of 
GE—as a transparent company.”64 Immelt continued: “If the annual report or 
quarterly report has to be the size of the New York City phone book, that’s 
life.”65  
 59. There is a rich literature discussing voluntary disclosure in the securities context. See Stephen 
J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
1657, 1720-23 (2002) (collecting citations). 
 60. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text. 
 61. Steve Liesman et al., New Leaves: Enron Triggers a Slew of Proposed Fixes, But What Will 
Stick?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at A1. 
 62. Rachel E. Silverman, GE to Change Its Practices of Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, 
at A3. 
 63. Rachel E. Silverman, GE’s Annual Report Bulges With Data in Bid to Address Post-Enron 
Concerns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2002, at A3. 
 64. Steve Liesman et al., New Leaves: Enron Triggers a Slew of Proposed Fixes, But What Will 
Stick?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2002, at A1. 
 65. Rachel E. Silverman, GE to Change Its Practices of Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2002, 
at A3. 
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III. THE GOALS OF DISCLOSURE, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, AND DECISION 
STRATEGIES 
A. The Means of Disclosure and the End of Informed Investor Decision 
Making 
People rarely want information for its own sake. Rather, people want 
information because it is empowering. Information enables those who have it 
to make informed decisions and to better protect their interests, whatever 
they may be. The federal securities laws are no different. The goal of the 
federal mandatory disclosure system is not disclosure. Disclosure is merely 
the chosen means to the end of informed investor decision making.66 In turn, 
a regime of disclosure, by getting more information into the hands of 
investors, securities analysts, brokers, arbitrageurs, and others, promotes 
investor confidence, capital market integrity, and, ultimately, capital market 
efficiency. Disclosure can also reduce agency costs.67 If the system works as 
intended, these goals are achieved through disclosures that improve the 
financial and operational transparency of companies—hence the recent 
expansion of disclosure requirements.68 Realistically, few people expect the 
“average” individual investor to focus in any detail on the information that 
 66. Although the discussion here is oriented toward the valuation of securities and buy/sell 
decisions, informed investor decision making also includes informed shareholder voting, as well as 
other steps investors, analysts, brokers, and others might take to monitor and discipline management. 
Informed investor decision making is about more than the accurate pricing of securities. 
 67. See infra notes 211-32 and accompanying text. 
 68. Transparency is important in another respect. The recent corporate scandals have not been 
limited to issuers. Scandals have also plagued leading financial institutions up and down Wall Street. 
Just as investors need information about companies in which they might invest, they need information 
about the financial firms and market professionals that they rely on for advice and that facilitate and 
broker financial transactions. For example, a “buy” recommendation from a securities analyst is 
useless (in fact, is harmful) if it does not reflect the analyst’s good faith analysis. At least in recent 
years, all too often an analyst’s recommendation was tainted by conflicts of interest—in particular, by 
pressure to write positive research reports and issue favorable recommendations so as not to jeopardize 
an existing or potential relationship with a company that could generate significant investment banking 
fees for the analyst’s firm and ultimately significant compensation for the analyst. See, e.g., Charles 
Gasparino, NASD Expands Inquiry to Analysts’ Bosses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at C1; Burton G. 
Malkiel, Remaking the Market: The Great Wall Street?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2002, at A16; Susan 
Pulliam & Randall Smith, SEC’s Pitt Seeks Split of Banking, Analyst Areas, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 
2002, at C1; Randall Smith & John Hechinger, Former Unit of Fleet Boston Receives Fines: Total of 
$33 Million Is Levied Over IPO Deals, Stock Research; SEC Sees Violation by Analyst, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 10, 2003, at C1; Michael Schroeder & Randall Smith, CSFB Analysts Felt Pressured On Stock 
Reports, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at C1. Ultimately, several leading financial institutions reached a 
$1.4 billion global regulatory settlement that addresses securities analyst conflicts of interest. See 
Stephen Labaton, 10 Wall Street Firms Settle with U.S. in Analyst Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, 
at A1; Randall Smith et al., Wall Street Firms to Pay $1.4 Billion to End Inquiry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
29, 2003, at A1. 
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companies disclose. As a practical matter, a company’s disclosures are 
largely “filtered” through experts—various securities professionals and 
financial intermediaries—who research and process the information and 
whose trades and recommendations ultimately set securities prices.69  
Two things are needed for a securities regulation regime based on 
disclosure to work. First, information has to be disclosed. The ever-growing 
panoply of statutes, rules, and regulations described above ensures that 
companies will disclose more and more information. After all is said and 
done in response to Enron et al., capital markets will have access to more 
information in a more timely manner than ever before. But disclosure of 
information is not enough for a disclosure-based regulatory system to 
succeed. Investors, analysts, and others need to use the disclosed information 
effectively for the disclosures to be useful. In other words, for our mandatory 
disclosure system to work, securities market participants must not only have 
access to information, but must be able to search and process in an effective 
manner the information that is disclosed.70 Otherwise, the information will 
not improve the quality of decision making. Concern for whether disclosures 
are understandable is nothing new. William O. Douglas, who later became 
chairman of the SEC and a Supreme Court Justice, was among the first to 
raise this concern. Shortly after the Securities Act was adopted, he wrote: 
But those needing investment guidance will receive small comfort 
from the balance sheets, contracts, or compilation of other data 
revealed in the registration statement. They either lack the training or 
intelligence to assimilate them and find them useful, or are so 
concerned with a speculative profit as to consider them irrelevant.71  
Professor Louis Loss echoed these sentiments, complaining that the 
readability of prospectuses was one of the fundamental shortcomings of the 
 69. For more on expert “filters,” see infra Part IV.B.1. 
 70. Professor Macey offers a complementary view in which he distinguishes the “supply side” of 
disclosure (i.e., the production, formatting, and dissemination of information) from the “demand side” 
of disclosure (i.e., the interpretation of information and its translation into trading decisions) and 
contends that demand-side problems were the primary cause of Enron’s demise and the other corporate 
scandals of the day. See Jonathan Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Debate Concerning the Relative Efficiency of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 
329 (2003). Information overload raises concerns that fall on the demand side of disclosure. As 
discussed below, infra Part V.A, certain supply-side measures, such as requiring better formatting and 
presentation of information, can help remedy demand-side problems.  
 71. William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 523-24 (1934) [hereinafter 
Douglas]. Douglas was skeptical that disclosure would adequately protect investors, and instead 
advocated more substantive regulation. Id. at 532; see also 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 
173-74. 
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registration process.72 The SEC has also recognized that the disclosure of 
information will not adequately protect investors or result in better decision 
making if investors are unable to understand and process the information. In 
1969, the Wheat Report concluded that prospectuses were often too long or 
complex and that investors could not easily understand them.73 More 
recently, the SEC’s Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, which was 
charged with making recommendations for streamlining, simplifying, and 
modernizing securities regulation, said that disclosure must be 
“understandable, complete and timely” to be effective and made a number of 
recommendations to simplify disclosure.74 In response to the Task Force’s 
findings, in 1998, the SEC adopted “plain English” reporting requirements to 
provide for more understandable disclosures.75 Even the ongoing debate over 
the expensing and reporting of stock options is about making a company’s 
financial disclosures more understandable by uncovering information buried 
in footnotes and putting it onto the company’s financial statements. To be 
sure, the presence of expert “filters” assuages concerns about 
understandability, but does not eliminate them.  
The issue of whether the information companies disclose is used 
effectively is much more complicated than William Douglas or Louis Loss 
appreciated or the SEC has recognized. The success of the federal mandatory 
disclosure system depends on more than purging SEC filings of legalese or 
uncovering information buried in footnotes. It depends on understanding how 
individuals process information and make decisions and on designing a 
regulatory regime that accounts for these realities of human psychology and 
decision making. Giving capital markets information, even in a readily 
readable form, is not enough. Ultimately, we need to understand better what 
investors and others do with the information in order to craft a disclosure 
regime that better satisfies the goals of the federal securities laws. 
 72. See LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 148-66 (1st ed. 1983) 
[hereinafter LOSS]. 
 73. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal of Federal 
Administrative Policies Under the ’33 and ’34 Acts: The Wheat Report 62-63 (1969) [hereinafter 
Wheat Report]. 
 74. See Securities & Exchange Commission, Report of the Task Force on Disclosure 
Simplification (Mar. 5, 1996), at http://sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htm [hereinafter Disclosure 
Simplification Task Force Report]. 
 75. See Covered Securities Pursuant to Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act 
Release No. 33-7497, 63 Fed. Reg. 3032 (Jan. 2, 1998).  
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B. Bounded Rationality and Our Limited Cognitive Abilities 
The federal securities law system has done an admirable job overall of 
ensuring that investors have access to material information. But scant 
attention has been paid to the question of how investors, analysts, brokers, 
and others search and process information and make decisions. In other 
words, how do investors and securities market professionals use the 
information the mandatory disclosure system provides them? Neither 
individual investors nor market professionals will make better informed 
decisions if they ignore the information they have or use it in an ineffective 
or even counterproductive manner.76 Then-SEC Commissioner Laura Unger 
put it this way: “As the Commission pursues new ways to help democratize 
access to investment information, we have to remember that information can 
only empower investors if they understand it and can effectively apply it. 
Access to information isn’t a substitute for knowing how to interpret it.”77  
The way people process information and make decisions is 
extraordinarily complicated and is the product of a number of psychological 
factors. The starting point for analyzing how people behave and think, if only 
because it makes modeling human behavior easier, is rationality—the 
assumption that individuals are able to anticipate and consider all relevant 
factors in making choices and that they have unlimited computational 
capabilities.78 In this view, only the decision environment, such as the 
information and choice set an individual faces, constrains a person’s 
decisions. A person cannot choose a course of action that is not available and 
 76. As Paul Slovic remarked over thirty years ago: 
Modern technology has contributed its share to the information explosion by making vastly 
greater quantities of elegant data readily available to the analyst, broker, and investor. However, 
little attention has been given to the problems of interpreting this information skillfully. Graham et 
al., in their classic treatise on security analysis, recognized the proper use of information as a key 
element of investment decision making. They observed, “After the analyst has learned what 
information he can get and where to get it, he faces the harder question: What use to make of it?” 
Paul Slovic, Psychological Study of Human Judgment: Implications for Investment Decision Making, 
27 J. FIN. 779, 779 (1972) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Slovic]. 
 77. SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Remarks at the Internet Securities Regulation American 
Conference Institute (June 26, 2000), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch387.htm [hereinafter 
Remarks by Commissioner Unger].  
 78. Herbert Simon describes the “economic man” who is perfectly rational as follows: 
This man is assumed to have knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment which, if not 
absolutely complete, is at least impressively clear and voluminous. He is assumed also to have a 
well-organized and stable system of preferences, and a skill in computation that enables him to 
calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are available to him, which of these will permit 
him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference scale. 
Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99 (1955) [hereinafter 
Simon, Behavioral Model].  
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cannot take into account information that is unknown. Many regulatory 
schemes, including the federal securities laws, assume that people, at least for 
the most part, are rational. Consequently, people simply need more 
information to better evaluate their options and make better decisions. If this 
is the case, more information is always better than less.  
But this is not always the case. Inadequate information is not the only 
problem that should concern regulators. Herbert Simon recognized nearly 
fifty years ago that the “environment of choice” is just the starting point of 
the decision-making process; the “properties of the choosing organism” also 
matter.79 Simon wrote: “But if we adopt this viewpoint, we must be prepared 
to accept that what we call ‘the environment’ may lie, in part, within the skin 
of the biological organism. That is, some of the constraints that must be taken 
as givens in an optimization problem may be physiological and 
psychological limitations of the organism (biologically defined) itself.”80 
Simon is credited with being among the first to point out that people have 
limited cognitive abilities to store, process, and interpret information.81 
According to Simon and others after him, people are boundedly rational, not 
perfectly rational.82  
Bounded rationality affects how people make decisions. Cognitive 
capabilities are scarce resources that have to be allocated; because of limited 
cognitive capabilities, people cannot attend to all the information made 
available to them and cannot evaluate all their choices perfectly.83 As a 
result, people decide how much time and effort to spend on a task and 
rationally exclude certain information and options, because to consider 
everything would make the decision-making process unmanageable and 
 79. Id. at 100. 
 80. Id. at 101. 
 81. Id. at 101 (“For example, the maximum speed at which an organism can move establishes a 
boundary on the set of its available behavior alternatives. Similarly, limits on computational capacity 
may be important constraints entering into the definition of rational choice under particular 
circumstances.”). 
 82. For a collection of Simon’s work, see HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982). For more on bounded rationality, 
see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 19-27 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge]; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law 
and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1051, 1075-02 (2000) [hereinafter Korobkin & Ulen]. Even proponents of rational choice theory 
recognize that people are not perfectly rational in reality. 
 83. Simon, Behavioral Model, supra note 78, at 101 (explaining that “limits on computational 
capacity” constrain a person’s “rational choice”); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as 
Product of Thought, 68 AM. ECON. REV., NO. 2, 1, 9-14 (1978) (explaining that the mind is a scarce 
resource) [hereinafter Simon, Rationality as Process]; Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making 
in Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 272-73 (1959) [hereinafter Simon, 
Theories of Decision-Making]. 
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overwhelming or would simply take too much time.84 Simon concludes that 
people “satisfice” rather than “optimize,” especially when faced with 
complex choices.85 People chose an “aspiration level,” which is to say some 
satisfactory outcome.86 They then strive to achieve this outcome, even if 
some “better” decision may exist in theory. In simpler terms, one can think of 
satisficing as doing the best as one can under the circumstances. This is not to 
say that individuals prefer to satisfice and not optimize. Rather, individuals 
satisfice because they do not have the cognitive capabilities to optimize.87  
At bottom, satisficing is a coping device for making complex choices 
under uncertainty.88 Decision makers trade off optimizing the outcome for 
simplifying the decision process.89 Later work by Simon and others, notably 
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, and Paul Slovic, further developed 
Simon’s basic insight by showing that individuals employ simplifying 
decision strategies or heuristics to make complex decisions.90 But what 
 84. See Simon, Behavioral Model, supra note 78, at 101 (explaining that people adopt “schemes 
of approximation” to simplify tasks), 104 (explaining that people take steps to simplify complex 
situations “to find an approximate model of manageable proportions”); Simon, Rationality as Process, 
supra note 83, at 9 (“As economics moves out toward situations of increasing cognitive complexity, it 
becomes increasingly concerned with the ability of actors to cope with the complexity, and hence with 
the procedural aspects of rationality.”).  
 85. Simon, Behavioral Model, supra note 78, at 104; Simon, Theories of Decision-Making, supra 
note 83, at 262-64.  
 86. See, e.g., Simon, Behavioral Model, supra note 78, at 103-04; Simon, Theories of Decision-
Making, supra note 83, at 263. 
 87. Satisficing can alternatively be thought of as optimizing subject to constraints. Cf. Russell 
Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, 
Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 48 (1999) (explaining that 
satisficing can be seen as “globally ‘rational’”) [hereinafter Korobkin]. 
 88. Simon, Behavioral Model, supra note 78, at 101; Simon, Theories of Decision-Making, supra 
note 83, at 256. 
 89. See, e.g., Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in 
Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 438 (1984) [hereinafter Malhotra, Reflections 
on Information Overload] (“While consumers may employ heuristics to limit the intake of 
information, these heuristics may often involve a tradeoff between simplifying and optimizing. . . . 
Hence, in the context of decision making, it is entirely possible for a consumer to adopt a choice 
heuristic that may limit cognitive strain but that may not lead to the ‘best’ or even to a satisfactory 
choice.”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 82, at 21 (explaining that people “attempt to minimize effort 
in the face of complexity and ambiguity”); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 82, at 1077-83; infra Part 
III.B. 
 90. See, e.g., Simon, Behavioral Model, supra note 78, at 100 (explaining that understanding 
how a person makes choices “involves some new considerations—in particular taking into account the 
simplifications the choosing organism may deliberately introduce into its model of the situation in 
order to bring the model within the range of its computing capacity”); JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Kahneman 
et al.]; JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 1-2 (1993) [hereinafter PAYNE ET 
AL.]; HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (1982). 
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factors determine the complexity and uncertainty of the task environment, 
and exactly how does decision making change as a result?  
C. How We Decide 
Human behavior is said to be “shaped by the interaction between the 
properties of the human information-processing system and the properties of 
task environments.”91 As Simon put it: “Human rational behavior is shaped 
by a scissors whose two blades are the structure of task environments and the 
computational capabilities of the actor.”92  
Imagine that you are an associate in a law firm representing a client in a 
large merger.93 As the most junior member of the legal team, you are stuck 
doing due diligence on the deal. On Monday morning, the senior partner 
hands you three boxes of documents and asks you to review the material, 
summarize your findings in a memorandum, and decide whether or not there 
are any significant legal risks that your client needs to resolve before closing 
the transaction. Because time is of the essence, you only have two days to 
complete your diligence. Now imagine that the situation is the same, except 
that instead of reviewing three boxes, you are asked to review fifty boxes of 
documents during the same two-day period. Will you go about your task 
differently? 
People make decisions in all sorts of ways. Building on earlier work by 
Simon and others, researchers have catalogued a number of decision 
strategies that individuals might adopt in different settings. These strategies 
can be understood primarily in terms of how much information a person 
considers and processes and the tradeoffs a person makes among the 
attributes that influence which alternative to choose.94  
The weighted adding strategy is the most thorough choice strategy. A 
person using this strategy considers all available information in evaluating all 
the attributes of each option.95 The decision maker first applies weights to all 
the attributes, thereby ranking how important each attribute is. The decision 
maker then trades off the attribute values of her options. In particular, she 
evaluates each attribute for each alternative and assigns a subjective value 
 91. James R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 
187, 187 (1998) (citation omitted) [hereinafter Bettman et al.]. 
 92. Herbert A. Simon, Invariants of Human Behavior, 41 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 1, 7 (1990).  
 93. In their leading book on contingent decision making, Payne, Bettman, and Johnson motivate 
their discussion by describing a similar task involving choosing between two applicants for a job. See 
PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90. 
 94. See Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 189-90. 
 95. Id. at 190; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 24; Korobkin, supra note 87, at 46. 
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that measures how each alternative does on each attribute. Then for each 
attribute, the decision maker multiplies the attribute’s weight times its 
subjective value. The weighted attribute values are then summed for all the 
attributes of each option. The decision maker is assumed to choose the option 
with the highest overall value or “score.”96 The weighted adding strategy 
requires a significant amount of information processing and computation that 
is unrealistic for most people. However, the effort is rewarded. The weighted 
adding strategy is thought to maximize the accuracy of the decision.97 As the 
choice strategy that a perfectly rational “optimizing” person would employ, 
something like the weighted adding strategy underlies many, if not most, 
economic models of behavior.  
The equal weight strategy is a relaxed variation of weighted adding.98 
This strategy considers each option and the attribute values for each option. 
Decision making, however, is simplified because certain information about 
attribute values is ignored. Specifically, the attributes are not weighted. The 
value of each option is simply the sum of the option’s attribute values. 
Notwithstanding this simplification, the equal weight strategy is thought to 
be highly accurate.99 
The lexicographic strategy is one of the simplest choice strategies.100 In 
fact, it is the near-opposite of the weighted adding strategy. An individual 
using the lexicographic strategy chooses the alternative that ranks the highest 
on the most important attribute. If two or more alternatives tie, the alternative 
with the best value on the next most important attribute is chosen, and so on 
until the tie is broken. This strategy allows a decision maker to consider less 
information and to avoid making explicit tradeoffs among attributes, since 
she only considers the most important attribute.  
Elimination-by-aspects is a more robust variation of the lexicographic 
 96. See Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 190. 
 97. The weighted adding strategy is considered to be highly “compensatory.” A “compensatory” 
decision strategy is one in which the decision maker makes tradeoffs among various attributes; 
strategies that do not involve making such tradeoffs are called “noncompensatory.” For example, with 
a compensatory strategy, a high score on one attribute might compensate for a low score on another 
attribute; whereas with a noncompensatory strategy, a high score on one attribute cannot make up for a 
low score on another. Compensatory strategies are generally thought to be more accurate than 
noncompensatory strategies. See generally PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 29-30; Bettman et al., 
supra note 91, at 190. For a useful illustration of compensatory versus noncompensatory decision 
strategies, see Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora’s Box? The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 801 (2003) [hereinafter Guthrie]. 
 98. PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 25; Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 190; Korobkin, supra 
note 87, at 50. 
 99. Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 190. 
 100. PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 26-27; Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 190; Korobkin, 
supra note 87, at 49. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss2/7
p417 Paredes book pages.doc10/27/03   10:34 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] BLINDED BY THE LIGHT 439 
 
 
 
 
 
strategy.101 The elimination-by-aspects strategy calls for the decision maker 
to rank the attributes according to their importance. The decision maker then 
chooses a cutoff value for the most important attribute. Each option that does 
not meet this minimum value is eliminated. If only one alternative remains, 
the decision maker chooses it. If more than one alternative remains, this 
elimination-by-aspects process is applied to the second most important 
attribute. The process continues until only one option remains.  
Under what circumstances do individuals use a particular decision 
strategy?102 Without having an answer to this question, a robust taxonomy of 
decision strategies might ultimately prove to be of little help to policy 
makers. The brain is a mysterious thing,103 and we do not know for certain 
when somebody will select one decision strategy over another or exactly how 
a strategy, once selected, will be used. A leading explanation of when 
individuals use certain decision strategies depends on a form of cognitive 
cost-benefit analysis,104 which fits into Simon’s model of satisficing. This 
cost-benefit-analysis explanation of strategy choice is premised on people’s 
bounded rationality, their limited cognitive capacity.105 The basic argument is 
that each decision strategy involves a tradeoff between its accuracy106 and the 
 101. PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 27; Bettman et al, supra note 91, at 190; Korobkin, supra 
note 87, at 49-50. 
 102. Individuals may, in fact, use combinations of strategies. For example, a person might initially 
use the lexicographic strategy to eliminate some alternatives and then employ the weighted adding 
strategy to evaluate the remaining alternatives in greater detail. See Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, 
Effort and Accuracy in Choice, 31 MGMT. SCI. 395, 408 (1985) [hereinafter Johnson & Payne]; 
Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 191.  
 103. Although advances in neuro-science may solve some of these mysteries.  
 104. Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 192; Stanley F. Biggs et al., The Effects of Task Size and 
Similarity on the Decision Behavior of Bank Loan Officers, 31 MGMT. SCI. 970, 972 (1985) 
[hereinafter Biggs et al.]; Don N. Kleinmuntz & David A. Schkade, Information Displays and 
Decision Processes, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 221, 223-24 (1993) [hereinafter Kleinmuntz & Schkade]; PAYNE 
ET AL., supra note 90, at 72-116. 
 105. There is an alternative approach to decision making—the “perceptual” approach—that does 
not center on accuracy/effort tradeoffs or cost-benefit analysis. According to the perceptual approach, 
people form perceptions that ultimately influence their decisions. For example, a decision maker might 
be influenced by how a choice is framed, might be averse to loss, or might focus on recent events in 
determining the likelihood of potential outcomes. The perceptual approach, however, can be integrated 
into the accuracy/effort framework. When the two approaches are integrated, the perceptual approach 
can help explain what information people focus on and how tasks are perceived; and the 
accuracy/effort approach can help explain how people use the information they notice and respond to 
the perceived task. See generally Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 192; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 
99-116; Kleinmuntz & Schkade, supra note 104, at 227. 
 106. The accuracy of a decision is difficult to measure. Nonetheless, typical metrics (or proxies) 
for measuring decision accuracy include: (1) how much information is used (often referred to as cue 
usage); (2) how consistent are a person’s decisions; and (3) how much consensus is there in the 
decisions among people. See Eugene G. Chewning, Jr. & Adrian M. Harrell, The Effects of 
Information Loan on Decision Makers’ Cue Utilization Levels and Decision Quality in a Financial 
Distress Decision Task, 15 ACCT., ORG. AND SOCIETY 527, 535-40 (1990) [hereinafter Chewning & 
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effort107 needed to implement the strategy. People are assumed to prefer 
more accurate decisions, but, everything else being the same, would like to 
exert less effort. Decision makers trade off their desire for accurate decisions 
and their desire to minimize cognitive effort until they reach an acceptable 
balance between accuracy and effort.  
Accuracy and effort levels vary across decision strategies. For example, 
for a given task, the weighted adding strategy is considered to be both more 
accurate and more effortful than the lexicographic strategy. The complexity 
of the task at hand influences the decision strategy a person uses, since more 
complex tasks require more effort. Studies show that when faced with a 
complicated task, a decision maker will often adopt a simplifying decision 
strategy, such as the lexicographic strategy or elimination-by-aspects, in 
effect sacrificing accuracy in order to reduce her cognitive burden.108 Faced 
with a simpler task, a decision maker is more likely to thoroughly consider 
all of her options by using a more complex109 strategy that evaluates more 
information.  
The typical assumption is that people can make better (i.e., more 
accurate) decisions with more information, and that people will make still 
better decisions with still more information. Indeed, this assumption 
undergirds the federal mandatory disclosure system. But does this 
assumption hold in every case? Do people necessarily make better choices 
with more information, or can a task become too complex? 
Because of bounded rationality, people can only process a finite amount 
Harrell]; Johnson & Payne, supra note 102, at 396-97; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 88-89; Slovic, 
supra note 76, at 783; Morris H. Stocks & Brad Tuttle, An Examination of Information Presentation 
Effects on Financial Distress Predictions, 6 ADVANCES IN ACCT. INFO. SYS. 107, 119 (1998) 
[hereinafter Stocks & Tuttle]. 
 107. Effort includes the cost of acquiring, verifying, and processing information. See, e.g., PAYNE 
ET AL., supra note 90, at 75-88; see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 593-609. 
 108. See Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 199; Stanley F. Biggs et al., The Effects of Task Size and 
Similarity on the Decision Behavior of Bank Loan Officers, 31 MGMT. SCI. 970, 974-76 (1985) 
[hereinafter Biggs et al.]; Sarah E. Bonner, A Model of the Effects of Audit Task Complexity, 19 ACCT., 
ORG. AND SOCIETY 213, 217, 220-21 (1994) [hereinafter Bonner]; Ellen C. Garbarino & Julie A. 
Edell, Cognitive Effort, Affect, and Choice, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 147, 148 (1997); Johnson & Payne, 
supra note 102, at 395; Kleinmuntz & Schkade, supra note 104, at 223; Korobkin, supra note 87, at 
52-54; Richard W. Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Decision Making: A 
Replication and Extension, 24 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 300, 300-01 (1979) [hereinafter 
Olshavsky]; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 12-15, 92-99. The fact that a person uses a simpler 
decision strategy, however, does not necessarily mean that he makes a worse decision. Indeed, a 
person might make a better decision by simplifying his task instead of trying to consider all relevant 
factors in a compensatory manner. See Johnson & Payne, supra note 102, at 408 (explaining that 
simpler strategies can approximate the same accuracy as complex strategies, but with significantly less 
cognitive effort).  
 109. In other words, more compensatory. See supra note 97. 
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of information during any particular period of time.110 These processing 
limitations are commonly thought to give rise to information overload.111 
Studies have shown that as a decision maker is given more information, 
decision quality initially increases; once the information level reaches a 
certain point, however, the decision maker’s decision quality decreases if she 
is given additional information.112 The idea is that at some point—many 
studies suggest between five and ten attributes per choice—people become 
overloaded with information and begin to make worse decisions.113  
One explanation of information overload is that as people try to process 
too much information, they simply become overwhelmed and confused. 
Their cognitive capabilities become strained and, if you will, short-circuit or 
malfunction. But there is an alternative explanation based on decision theory. 
The amount of information facing the decision maker—often referred to as 
 110. See Simon, Theories of Decision-Making, supra note 83, at 273; Simon, Behavioral Model, 
supra note 78, at 100; Simon, Rationality as Process, supra note 83, at 13; see also supra notes 79-90 
and accompanying text. 
 111. The literature on information overload is extensive. For a sampling of the literature, see 
Bettman et al., supra note 91; Bonner, supra note 108; Cornelius J. Casey, Jr., Variation in Accounting 
Information Load: The Effect on Loan Officers’ Predictions of Bankruptcy, 89 ACCT. REV. 36 (1980) 
[hereinafter Casey]; Chewning & Harrell, supra note 106; Michael J. Driver & Theodore J. Mock, 
Human Information Processing, Decision Style Theory, and Accounting Information Systems, 52 
ACCT. REV. 490 (1977); Errol R. Iselin, Accounting Information and the Quality of Financial 
Managerial Decisions, 22 J. INFORMATION SCI. 147 (1996) [hereinafter Iselin]; Kevin Lane Keller & 
Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 200 (1987) [hereinafter Keller & Staelin]; Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and 
Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 419 (1982) [hereinafter Malhotra, Information 
Load]; Malhotra, Reflections on Information Overload, supra note 89; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 
34-36; Roger Simnett, The Effect of Information Selection, Information Processing, and Task 
Complexity on Predictive Accuracy of Auditors, 21 ACCT., ORG., & SOCIETY 699 (1996) [hereinafter 
Simnett]; Doug Snowball, Some Effects of Accounting Expertise and Information Load: An Empirical 
Study, 5 ACCT., ORG. & SOCIETY 323 (1980) [hereinafter Snowball]; Cheri Speier et al., The Influence 
of Task Interruption on Individual Decision Making: An Information Overload Perspective, 30 
DECISION SCI. 337 (1999) [hereinafter Speier et al.]; Morris H. Stocks & Adrian Harrell, The Impact of 
an Increase in Accounting Information Level on the Judgment of Individuals and Groups, 20 ACCT., 
ORG. & SOCIETY 685 (1995) [hereinafter Stocks & Harrell]; Stocks & Tuttle, supra note 106; Brad 
Tuttle & F. Greg Burton, The Effect of a Modest Incentive on Information Overload in an Investment 
Analysis Task, 24 ACCT., ORG. & SOCIETY 673 (1999) [hereinafter Tuttle & Burton].  
 112. Information overload is usually reflected in an inverted-U shaped curve, plotting decision 
quality (y-axis) against the quantity of information (x-axis). See, e.g., Tuttle & Burton, supra note 111, 
at 674; Stocks & Harrell, supra note 111, at 686; Simnett, supra note 111, at 703; Chewning & 
Harrell, supra note 106, at 527. 
 
 113. Chewning & Harrell, supra note 106, at 530; Iselin, supra note 111, at 150; Korobkin, supra 
note 87, at 52-53; Malhotra, Reflections on Information Overload, supra note 89, at 437-38; Malhotra, 
Information Load, supra note 111, at 427; Simnett, supra note 111, at 702; Speier et al., supra note 
111, at 338-39; Stocks & Harrell, supra note 111, at 686; Tuttle & Burton, supra note 111, at 673-74. 
Time pressure appears to be an important contributor to information overload. See Bettman et al., 
supra note 91, at 200; Korobkin, supra note 87, at 54; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 37-40; Dan 
Zakay, Post-Decisional Confidence and Conflict Experienced in a Choice Process, 58 ACTA 
PSYCHOLOGICA 75, 79 (1985). 
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“task size”—is one of the most important factors contributing to task 
complexity and thus influencing a person’s decision strategy.114 The amount 
of information involved in making a decision increases if the number of 
alternatives a person faces increases, if there are more attributes to consider 
for each option, or if the amount of available information per attribute 
increases.  
As explained above, studies show that people shift to simplifying decision 
strategies that are less accurate as tasks become more complicated.115 Not 
only will people make fewer comparisons across choices and attributes, but 
when faced with a complicated task, a decision maker will tend to become 
more selective in the information she chooses to analyze.116 It is possible that 
as more information becomes available, a person might use less information, 
on net, as the information search and processing costs increase. Making 
matters worse, studies show that people do not always focus on the most 
relevant information but might become distracted by less relevant 
information.117  
The net result of having access to more information in combination with 
using a less accurate decision strategy as the information load increases is 
often an inferior decision.118 The essence of information overload is that a 
decision maker may make better decisions when she brings a more complex 
decision strategy to bear on less information than when she brings a simpler 
decision strategy to bear on more information. Put differently, “[A] useful 
way of thinking about the concept of information overload is that it arises 
when the incremental decreases in decision effectiveness due to additional 
information quantity are greater than the incremental increases in decision 
effectiveness due to the additional information quality.”119 Information 
 114. See Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 199-200; Biggs et al., supra note 108, at 972-76; 
Bonner, supra note 108, at 214-18; Chewning & Harrell, supra note 106, at 527-30; Korobkin, supra 
note 87, at 52-53; Olshavsky, supra note 108, at 301, 313; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 34-37; 
Simnett, supra note 111, at 701-03.  
 115. See supra notes 95-115. 
 116. See, e.g., Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 200; Biggs et al., supra note 108, at 974; Korobkin, 
supra note 87, at 53-54; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 200. 
 117. See, e.g., Nisbett et al., The Dilution Effect: Nondiagnostic Information Weakens the 
Implications of Diagnostic Information, 13 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 248, 248 (1981); PAYNE ET AL., 
supra note 90, at 36-37; Philip E. Tetlock & Richard Boettger, Accountability: A Social Magnifier of 
the Dilution Effect, 57 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 388 (1989) [hereinafter Tetlock & 
Boettger] (discussing the “dilution effect”); Steven M. Glover, The Influence of Time Pressure and 
Accountability on Auditors’ Processing of Nondiagnostic Information, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 213, 214-16 
(same) [hereinafter Glover].  
 118. For a more formalized treatment of information overload, see Keller & Staelin, supra note 
111.  
 119. Id. at 202. 
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overload, notably, does not depend on irrelevant or less important 
information crowding out material information, although that sometimes 
happens. A decision maker may suffer from information overload even if all 
the information disclosed is material to the decision. I should point out, 
though, that the decision maker still may be better off using a simpler 
decision strategy than if she tried to evaluate all the information available to 
her using a more complicated strategy; but she might be able to make an 
even better decision with less information overall. 
Some have charged that information never overloads individuals.120 For 
example, in an important article, David Grether, Alan Schwartz, and Louis 
Wilde (“GSW”) argue that people cope with large amounts of information by 
adopting simplifying decision strategies and thereby avoid becoming 
overloaded.121 GSW essentially argue that people, being rational, optimize 
subject to constraints. That is to say, they do the best they can under the 
circumstances. In this framework, the constraints subject to which people 
make decisions are their limited cognitive abilities and, presumably, time 
limitations. Constrained optimization of this sort, however, is not inconsistent 
with information overload. Information overload never suggests that people 
are not acting rationally when they adopt simpler decision strategies to cope 
with complex tasks. The relevant question is not whether individuals do the 
best they can given the information load facing them. One hopes that they do. 
Rather, the key question is whether the task environment can be manipulated 
in a way that alleviates the relevant constraints and improves decision 
quality. One option might be to give people less information.  
Much of the information overload literature studies how consumers 
choose products, ranging from jam to housing, and the effect of consumer 
product labeling.122 Numerous studies, however, have identified information 
overload in the context of financial and accounting decisions, and the related 
literature is extensive.123  
 120. See, e.g., David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of 
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 278, 287-94 (1986) [hereinafter Grether et al., The 
Irrelevance of Information Overload]. 
 121. Id. For comments on GSW, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 
(1986), and Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their 
Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (1986). 
 122. See, e.g., infra note 270. 
 
 123. See, e.g., Ravindranath Madhavan & John E. Prescott, Market Value Impact of Joint 
Ventures: The Effect of Industry Information-Processing Load, 38 ACADEMY OF MGMT. J. 900 (1995) 
(measuring market value impact of joint venture announcements as a function of quantity of industry 
information); Stocks & Harrell, supra note 111 (summarizing studies; predicting financial distress); 
Stocks & Tuttle, supra note 106 (predicting financial distress); Andrew L. Zacharakis & G. Dale 
Meyer, The Potential of Actuarial Decision Models: Can they Improve the Venture Capital Investment 
Decision, 175 BUS. VEN. 323 (2000) (making venture capital investment decisions); Simnett, supra 
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IV. INFORMATION OVERLOAD AND THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
A. Taking Stock of Information Overload 
Is the federal system of mandatory disclosure effective? Not all 
disclosures are effective, and some may be counterproductive. For some 
time, those in the field of behavioral finance who study the psychology of 
investing have claimed that investors, analysts, and other securities market 
professionals are not perfectly rational. Not only do people have imperfect 
information and limited cognitive abilities,124 but they are subject to 
numerous cognitive biases.125 The corollary, of course, is that the way 
investors, analysts, and others actually behave and make decisions matters to 
capital markets, affecting whether capital markets are efficient and whether 
securities are accurately priced.126 Nonetheless, a persistent assumption 
note 111 (predicting bankruptcy); Bonner, supra note 108 (summarizing studies); Biggs et al., supra 
note 108 (loan decisions); Chewning & Harrell, supra note 106 (predicting financial distress); Tuttle & 
Burton, supra note 111 (summarizing studies; estimating stock prices); Casey, supra note 111 
(summarizing studies; predicting bankruptcy); Iselin, supra note 111 (summarizing studies); Snowball, 
supra note 111 (estimating future cash flows). Professors David Hirshleifer, Seongyeon Lim, and Siew 
Hong Teoh offer a complementary model of investor decision making in which they model how the 
limited attention of investors leads to the incomplete usage of information as a result of cue 
competition (the tendency for an investor’s observations of one disclosure to distract the investor from 
other information, leading to the crowding out of more relevant information by less relevant 
information) and analytical interference (the tendency for disclosures in one area to distract an investor 
from appropriately accounting for the failure of a company to disclose other information). The upshot 
of limited attention is that investors ignore useful information. See David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong 
Teoh, Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial Reporting (Dec. 2002), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=334940 [hereinafter Hirshleifer & Teoh]; David 
Hirshleifer et al., Disclosure to a Credulous Audience: The Role of Limited Attention, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=300544 [hereinafter Hirshleifer et al.]. 
 124. See supra Parts III.B & III.C. 
 125. Professor Prentice recently summed up the point well: “[V]irtually everyone now recognizes 
that there is a large gap between the manner in which economists traditionally assume that people 
think and act, and the manner in which people actually do think and act.” Robert Prentice, Wither 
Securities Regulation?: Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 1397, 1413 (2002) [hereinafter Prentice]. Explaining and understanding these deviations from 
perfect rationality make up the core of behavioral law and economics. See generally BEHAVIORAL 
LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sustein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1995); Russell Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to 
Legal Scholarship: Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutional Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS 
J. 319 (2001); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 82; Arlen, supra note 10. 
 
 126. For a good overview of behavioral finance, see generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
EXUBERANCE (2000) [hereinafter SHILLER]; ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN 
INRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) [hereinafter SHLEIFER]; HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND 
GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING 
(2000) [hereinafter SHEFRIN]; David Hirshleifer, Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing, 56 J. FIN. 
1533 (2001) [hereinafter Hirshleifer]; Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock 
Market: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002) [hereinafter 
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits]; Prentice, supra note 125. For an interesting argument in favor 
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underlying securities regulation is that securities market participants are 
perfectly rational, or at least close enough.127 This is starting to change, at 
least in academic circles if not yet in courtrooms or at the SEC. The 
psychology of investing is starting to influence how we think about the 
proper structure and enforcement of the federal securities laws.128 While I do 
not think we are ready to toss aside the rationality assumption completely, we 
are at the point where we should focus more on how people really act and 
think in regulating our capital markets.129 Investing is not easy, and requires 
lots of tough decisions. Despite the references in the financial media, judicial 
opinions, and scholarly work to a company’s “fundamental value” or 
“intrinsic value,”130 no such figure actually exists. Rather, investors and 
analysts consider vast quantities of information for numerous companies, in 
addition to important macroeconomic factors, and decide what a particular 
security is worth, and then buy, sell, or do nothing accordingly. As Professor 
Slovic put it: “In no other realm are such vast quantities of information from 
such diverse sources brought to bear on so many important decisions. Careful 
accumulation and skilled interpretation of this information is said to be the 
of investor irrationality, on the grounds that irrationality adds liquidity to capital markets and 
ultimately makes markets more efficient, see Gregory La Blanc & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, In Praise of 
Investor Irrationality (manuscript on file with author). 
 127. See, e.g., Langevoort, Market Efficiency Revisited, supra note 20, at 912-20; Langevoort, 
Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126, at 135-39; Prentice, supra note 125, at 1408. 
 128. Professor Langevoort is helping lead the effort to incorporate investor psychology into 
securities regulation. See, e.g., Langevoort, Market Efficiency Revisited, supra note 20; Langevoort, 
Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126 (referring to “behavioral securities regulation”); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market 
Investors (and Cause Other Social Harm), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers 
and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996); see also Stephen Bainbridge, Mandatory 
Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 (2000); Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. 
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (Mar. 1, 2003 
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Choi & Pritchard]; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral 
Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2002); Kent Greenfield, Using 
Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 
UC DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); Prentice, supra note 125; Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the 
Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 65 NW. U. L. REV. 133 
(2000); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 UC DAVIS L. REV. 903 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 
2003) (manuscript at 17-25, on file with the author) [hereinafter Stout, An Introduction to the New 
Finance]; Robert Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The Impact of Cognitive 
Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1997). 
 129. See Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126 (suggesting a move toward 
“behavioral securities regulation”); see also Prentice, supra note 125, at 1413 (explaining that 
assuming investor rationality is a “dangerous simplification” for the federal securities laws to rely on). 
 130. “Fundamental” or “intrinsic” value refers to a company’s supposed true or actual value—in 
other words, what the underlying business is objectively worth. See infra notes 297-300 and 
accompanying text. 
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sine qua non of accurate evaluation of securities.”131 
Information overload is part of the larger inquiry into investor psychology 
and its implications for market efficiency, security pricing, and securities 
regulation. Information overload could have profound implications for our 
mandatory disclosure system. In requiring more and more disclosure, 
securities regulation has paid little attention to how investors use information 
or make decisions.132 This is ill-advised.133 Disclosure-based regulatory 
regimes should focus on more than getting the information out. A regime like 
the federal securities laws needs to consider how more disclosure affects 
decision making. Meaningful, effective disclosure does not simply mean 
more disclosure. Because of information overload, in some cases, more 
disclosure can mean less effective disclosure.  
Concerns that investors are becoming overloaded with information have 
intensified, especially in light of the new disclosure requirements mandated 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and new SEC requirements.134 For example, SEC 
Commissioner Cynthia Glassman has stated: “So now we turn to the task of 
determining how to get more transparency—true transparency and not just 
more data with the unintended consequence of investor overload and the 
 131. Slovic, supra note 76, at 779; see also KRIPKE, supra note 11, at 77 (“Although SEC 
disclosure has been marked by a search for objectivity, the unfortunate reality is that values of 
securities depend on estimates of the interactive effects of conscious decisions and uncontrollable 
events, and on judgment in the face of uncertainty and change.”). 
 132. An exception to the “more-disclosure-is-better-than-less” approach that springs to mind is the 
prohibition on “gun jumping.” The federal securities laws limit the information an issuer can disclose 
leading up to a public offering. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 442-64. The implications of 
investor psychology and decision making for the prohibition on gun jumping, and for the entire 
registration process, deserve future consideration.  
 133. Disclosing more and more information might not only be ill-advised because of the risk of 
information overload; it might also be ill-advised because more disclosure increases compliance costs, 
can chill risk-taking, and increases the cost to process information. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra 
note 19, at 593-609 (explaining that capital markets become less efficient as information costs, 
consisting of the cost of acquiring, verifying, and processing information, increase). 
 134. Professor Schwarcz has recently raised a related concern. Focusing on structured finance 
transactions, Schwarcz explains that some transactions are so complex that disclosures are “necessarily 
imperfect.” Either the description of the transaction is oversimplified or it is too complicated for most 
people to understand, including securities market professionals like analysts. It is not clear, for 
example, that investors or analysts would have done a better job with more detailed disclosures about 
Enron’s special purpose entities. Schwarcz considers the following possible responses to the 
necessarily imperfect disclosures relating to complex securitization or derivatives deals: tolerate it; ban 
transactions where the information asymmetry exceeds some threshold; or require supplemental 
protections to minimize the asymmetry and its consequences. Schwarcz concludes that a rule should be 
adopted requiring “management to be free of any material conflicts of interest in disclosure-impaired 
transactions.” See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity 
(Oct. 30, 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=336685 [hereinafter Schwarcz]; 
see also Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May,” 48 VILL. L. 
REV. 1245 (2003) (expressing concern about the complexity of derivative disclosures) [hereinafter 
Partnoy]. 
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unnecessary reporting burden on companies.”135 Then-acting SEC Chairman 
Laura Unger, in expressing doubt about Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), 
made a similar point: “As a Commissioner of a disclosure-based agency, I 
believe that more information is generally better. But is that always the case? 
. . . . [W]hat if the proposals are adopted and result in significantly greater 
amounts of information coming out in the form of press releases? Do we 
need to be concerned about potential ‘information overload’? . . . . [W]e have 
to remember that information can only empower investors if they understand 
it and can effectively apply it.”136 Further, a number of commentators at a 
series of roundtables organized by the SEC in the spring of 2002 expressed 
concern about information overload.137 For example, John Rekenthaler, 
Research Director at Morningstar Investor Services, said: “One of our stock 
analysts noted that Nortel’s 10-K Report had 220 pages. I don’t think we 
need another ten or 20 pages added to that. In fact, we could probably shrink 
it fairly effectively.”138 And Dwight Churchill, Senior Vice President and 
Head of Fixed Income at Fidelity Investments, commented: “[W]e’re 
requiring analysts to sift through a huge amount of information . . . . They 
can’t use [MD&A] to help them a whole lot, and so they end up having to 
sort back through to figure out exactly what’s going on. It’s putting too much 
of a burden on them. And, given the economics and the number of 
companies these different analysts are following, it’s very difficult for them 
to draw the correct picture of an organization.”139  
 135. SEC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Opening Remarks Before the Symposium on 
Enhancing Financial Transparency, Securities and Exchange Commission Policy Roundtable 
Symposium on Enhancing Financial Transparency (June 4, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/spch565.htm. 
 136. Remarks by Commissioner Unger, supra note 77. 
 137. Financial Disclosure and Auditor Oversight Roundtables, Panel 1 (Improving Financial 
Disclosure), Mar. 4, 2002, Mar. 6, 2002, & Apr. 4, 2002, transcript at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
extra/marchroundcast.htm [hereinafter Panel 1]. It is worth pointing out that these commentators 
squarely fall within the scope of expert “filters.” See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 138. Panel 1, supra note 137, at 4. 
 139. Id. at 6. For more on information overload, see Douglas, supra note 71, at 527 (“So 
complicated is the matter that it is hardly conceivable that the mass of data will prove digestible.”); 
SEC Advisory Committee Report, supra note 15, at D-8 (explaining that “some argue that if 
information oriented to audiences other than investors or shareholders were required to be included in 
filings with the Commission, investors and shareholders would be compelled to sift out that which is 
relevant to their views, thereby hampering investment and corporate suffrage decision-making”); 
Prentice, supra note 125, at 1511 n.241 (collecting additional citations); Partnoy, supra note 134 
(collecting additional citations in the context of derivative disclosures); Alex Berenson, Of Information 
Overload and the “Efficient” Market, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2000, § 3 at 1; Jeffrey Bronchick, We 
Need Better Stock Analysis, Not More Info, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2002, at A20; D. Keith Denton, 
Better Decisions with Less Information, INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT, July/Aug. 2001, at 21; Sarah 
Hewitt et al., SEC Internet Report, THE NAT’L L.J., Jan. 24, 2000, at B5; Gretchen Morgenson, Annual 
Reports: More Pages, But Better?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002, § 3 at 1; Hal R. Varian, Investor 
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Certain features of securities regulation already account for the risk of 
information overload, at least to some degree. First is the concept of 
“materiality.” Take fraud under the federal securities laws. For a 
misstatement or omission to constitute fraud, it must be material. In TSC 
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,140 the Supreme Court held that a fact is 
“material” if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”141 In adopting this 
standard, the Supreme Court rejected the view that a fact is material if an 
investor “might” find it important.142 The Court was concerned that such a 
low threshold of materiality would lead to a flood of disclosures that would 
ultimately swamp investors: “Some information is of such dubious 
significance that insistence on its disclosure may accomplish more harm than 
good. . . . [M]anagement’s fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may 
cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial 
information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed 
decisionmaking.”143 
Financial statements are a second example. Financial statements reflect an 
aggregation or consolidation of financial information about a company. 
Instead of disclosing raw data, companies summarize their financial 
condition over certain periods of time in a standardized format—balance 
sheets, income statements, statements of cash flow, and the like. One reason 
to allow, and in fact require, this standardized consolidation of information is 
Behavior Clouds the Wisdom of Offering Wider Choice in 401(k)’s, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at C2; 
Mike McNamee, The SEC Isn’t Answering Investors’ Prayers, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (June 7, 
2002), at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdailyldnflach/jun2002/nf2002067_5252.htm (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2003); Pitt, Written Testimony, supra note 16, at 7 (“We also recommend improving other 
disclosure requirements to provide disclosure of higher quality, while avoiding greater quantity for 
quantity’s sake.”). 
 140. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 141. Id. at 449. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 448. The Court made a similar point in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, in which it adopted the 
“probability/magnitude” test for determining whether speculative information is material: “The role of 
the materiality requirement . . . [is to] filter out essentially useless information that a reasonable 
investor would not consider significant, even as part of a larger ‘mix’ of factors to consider in making 
his investment decision.” 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988) (holding that materiality “will depend at any given 
time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated 
magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity”). 
 As Professor Partnoy has recently pointed out, in adopting rules implementing § 401(a) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires new disclosures for off-balance sheet transactions, the SEC 
adopted a similar “reasonably likely” standard (requiring disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions 
that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on the company’s financial condition) to avoid the 
risk that investors, analysts, and others would become “overwhelmed” with information under a “may” 
standard. See Partnoy, supra note 134 (ultimately critical of the “reasonably likely” standard, 
preferring a “may” standard). 
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that investors would be unable to wade through and process a company’s raw 
data, and the standardized format of financial statements facilitates financial 
comparisons across companies.  
A final example is MD&A. Instead of requiring companies to disclose 
trends or uncertainties that are material under the probability/magnitude test 
of Basic Inc. v. Levinson,144 companies are required to disclose only known 
trends or uncertainties that have had or are reasonably likely to have a 
material impact on the business.145 Professor Langevoort has suggested that 
this reflects concern that using materiality as the threshold for an affirmative 
obligation to disclose forward-looking information would encourage 
excessive disclosure.146 
The slogan of “disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure”147 
is too simplistic of a basis upon which to premise our securities regulation 
regime. But taking stock of how people use the information disclosed begs 
the tough question: How should we respond to the information overload risk? 
What should we do when disclosure compromises the ability of investors, 
analysts, and other securities market participants to make sound investment 
decisions? Should our mandatory disclosure system require less, not more, 
disclosure? How do we weigh concerns about the ability of investors and 
analysts to process information against their continuing cries for more 
information? Given the increasing influence that the psychology of investing 
is likely to exert on securities regulation, and given that the securities laws 
are mandating more and more disclosure, these questions deserve serious 
consideration. 
B. Rationalizing Information Overload and the Federal Securities Laws 
Not every problem warrants a solution. So before considering whether the 
federal securities laws should require less disclosure or adopt some other fix, 
it is worth pausing to consider how serious the risk of information overload 
is. People might do well enough in the face of increasing amounts of 
information that no regulatory fix is justified, especially one that runs directly 
counter to the overall structure of our federal securities laws by calling for 
less disclosure. Investors and analysts, for example, might on the whole 
make good decisions using heuristics or less complex decision strategies to 
 144. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text. 
 145. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.303 (2003). 
 146. Donald C. Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced 
Investing, 75 WASH U. L.Q. 753, 775 (1997) [hereinafter Langevoort, More Effective Risk Disclosure]. 
 147. 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 29. 
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cope with vast amounts of information, such that the gap between the “ideal” 
outcome and the actual decision is not wide enough to justify a regulatory 
response.148 Moreover, there is a risk that investors and analysts might make 
worse decisions if given less information, particularly if the information 
disclosed is less useful than what is omitted.  
At present, we do not know to what extent investors and analysts are 
subject to information overload or how they will respond to less information. 
We need more data.149 Even with more studies and experiments testing for 
information overload, however, the extent of the problem will be difficult to 
gauge since we only have rough measures for determining a decision’s 
accuracy.150 In addition, there is always the risk that the studies and 
experiments relied on may be incorrect, and there is a dangerous tendency to 
take a relatively narrow study or experiment that is highly qualified in its 
findings and draw much larger conclusions and implications that the data 
may not sustain.151  
Although we should be cautious before significantly cutting back the 
level of disclosure under the federal securities laws, how people actually 
process information and make decisions should begin to factor in to how we 
 148. See Eric J. Johnson & John W. Payne, Effort and Accuracy in Choice, 31 MGMT. SCI. 395, 
408 (1985) (explaining that “heuristics can approximate the accuracy of normative rules with 
substantial savings in effort”). Others have raised similar concerns in responding to calls for more (not 
less) disclosure in the context of consumer choice. See Grether et al., Information Overload, supra 
note 120, at 279-80 (“For example, if consumers would satisfice as the result of a disclosure 
requirement meant to cure the problem that too little information exists, would consumers still be 
doing better than they had done before the state’s intervention? Is the satisficing that accompanies 
product search amenable to regulatory solution? Is the gap between satisficing and optimizing—how 
well consumers actually do in contrast to the ideal—often large enough to justify regulatory 
concern?”). 
 149. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text. Indeed, one of the arguments against 
behavioral law and economics is that the data are inconclusive and there is no theory to explain the 
alleged cognitive biases that are observed. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 10, at 1776-88. 
 150. See supra note 106 for a discussion of how decision accuracy is measured. Further, it might 
be appropriate to ask an even more fundamental question before making any decision about 
revamping, or perhaps even tinkering with, our securities laws in response to empirical studies. That is, 
in general, to what extent should we rely on social science in developing or revamping legal 
institutions or making policy, particularly if the legal or policy change would be a radical departure 
from the existing regime? This question, which I do not purport to resolve here, has been a 
controversial topic at least since Justice Holmes wrote in Lochner v. New York that “the 14th 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics . . . [or] embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or laissez faire.” 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting).  
 151. In other words, there is a danger that the data will be misused or even abused, in which case 
the legal change supported by the data very well might not be justified and, worse yet, might be 
counterproductive. It is, however, worth noting that if relevant data are ignored on these or other 
grounds, another theory of decision making will be advanced—namely, rational choice theory—if only 
by default.  
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regulate our capital markets.152 If it turns out that investors do not seriously 
suffer from information overload, all the better. But it is fair to say, and 
others agree,153 that there is a growing risk of information overload. At the 
very least, considering the possibility of information overload suggests both 
the limitations of disclosure as a regulatory device as well as ways to disclose 
information more effectively, and might temper our tendency to disclose 
more information without accounting more critically for its potential impact 
on the user.154 Given the risk of overload, even if we do not yet know its 
precise magnitude for every securities market participant, there very well 
might be certain disclosures worth deleting presently.  
I am not suggesting that we should never require additional disclosures. 
New disclosures might be needed when we learn new things about the 
structure of our capital markets, the practices of financial institutions, 
accounting practices, or what drives investor valuations. We might even 
learn that people can handle more information than we thought. Furthermore, 
whatever the level of mandatory disclosure, the mix of information matters; 
the most useful information should be disclosed.155 Accordingly, it is likely 
that we would add certain disclosures, even if the disclosure system were 
scaled back as a whole.  
The bottom-line point is that before disclosing more information simply 
because we have a disclosure-based regulatory system, we need to give more 
thought to how the information will be used.156 More information is not per 
 152. See Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126; Prentice, supra note 125. 
Interestingly, investor psychology, in the form of SEC and congressional focus on boosting investor 
trust and confidence, already does play a role in securities regulation. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The 
Investor Confidence Game (Aug. 14, 2002), at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=322301 [hereinafter Stout, 
Investor Confidence]; Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors’ Trust in the Securities Markets (Sept. 
23, 2002), at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=333340 [hereinafter Frankel]. At bottom, trust and confidence 
are psychological.  
 153. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. 
 154. Professor Langevoort has made a similar point in the context of cognitive biases:  
To me, that evidence presents a fairly strong case for the presence of significant market 
inefficiencies. But it is not dispositive and leaves open to question both the specific directions that 
the inefficiency takes and the magnitude of the deviations. For now, the most valuable use of the 
evidence may well be in the form that I have followed here: using the [inefficient market 
hypothesis] and behavioral literature to see possibilities . . . [that] can help us think through 
difficult problems outside the box of conventional theories of investor behavior. In formulating 
strategy in the face of an admittedly imperfect understanding of the stock markets, we can at least 
consider hedging our bets. 
Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126, at 187. 
 155. See infra notes 197-200. 
 156. Cf. Langevoort, Market Efficiency Revisited, supra note 20, at 914 (cautioning against 
reifying market “efficiency” rhetoric); Prentice, supra note 125, at 1411-12 (“Any proposal to 
completely restructure securities market regulation should pay less obeisance to simplifying 
assumptions of traditional economic reasoning and more attention to that reasoning’s limitations than 
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se better than less.157  
The potential merits of disclosing less are straightforward. If users are 
able to process information more effectively when faced with less 
information, better investment decisions might result if disclosure is scaled 
back. In other words, less information might promote informed investor 
decision making.158 There are other benefits too. A less stringent mandatory 
disclosure system should decrease compliance costs and the risk of liability, 
in turn driving down the cost of capital. But are there costs of requiring less 
disclosure? The decision to scale back disclosure is more complicated than 
this somewhat syllogistic analysis suggests. Other factors would need to be 
considered in making any policy decision to relax our mandatory disclosure 
system. 
1. Expert “Filters”  
One would anticipate the following response to concerns about 
information overload: Individual investors might be overloaded, but the 
expert “filters”—securities analysts, money managers, institutional investors, 
sophisticated individual investors, arbitrageurs, brokers, and other securities 
market professionals and financial intermediaries159—the federal securities 
laws rely on to decipher and analyze information160 are not overloaded. As 
William O. Douglas put it when the Securities Act was adopted: “[E]ven 
though an investor has neither the time, money, nor intelligence to assimilate 
the mass of information in the registration statement, there will be those who 
can and who will do so, whenever there is a broad market.”161 The argument 
is that the individual investor gets the benefit of the experts’ ability to search 
[Professor] Choi’s proposal [for investor regulation] does.”); KRIPKE, supra note 11, at 59 
(questioning the SEC’s “obsessive approach” to disclose more). 
 157. Another option would be for the government, perhaps the SEC, to engage in some type of 
merit review. As noted above, this type of substantive regulation was rejected in favor of a disclosure-
based system when the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were adopted. See supra notes 15-17 and 
accompanying text. I am not aware of any serious proposals, even in light of the recent scandals, 
advocating that the government become the country’s broker or securities analyst. Accordingly, I am 
only going to make two quick points about merit review. First, the government experts chosen to give 
investment advice, or otherwise evaluate companies and their securities, would be imperfectly rational 
and subject to cognitive biases like everybody else. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 128. Second, one 
could imagine an entire array of public choice problems associated with this type of merit review. See 
generally PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Maxwell L. Stearns ed., 1997). 
 158. To the extent investors demand additional information, companies would have an incentive 
to disclose it. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 159. We might even include the financial media among the expert filters. 
 160. See Wheat Report, supra note 73, at 52. 
 161. Douglas, supra note 71, at 524. 
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and process large amounts of information, even if she is herself overloaded. 
Indeed, the experts get the benefit of each other’s ability to search and 
process large amounts of information effectively. In this view, there is no 
need to worry about information overload. First, most investors are passive in 
the sense that they invest through mutual funds, which we assume to be 
managed by sophisticated, competent money managers with the support of 
numerous analysts.162 Second, many investors, whether they invest through 
mutual funds or buy individual securities, rely on financial advisors or 
stockbrokers for investing advice or at least read the research reports put out 
by brokerage firms and others. Third, and perhaps most importantly, is the 
efficient capital market hypothesis. In this view, the experts protect even the 
investor who “goes it alone,” since the buying and selling of informed traders 
will ultimately incorporate available public information into securities prices. 
As then-Professor Easterbrook and Professor Fischel put it, “The uninformed 
traders can take a free ride on the information impounded by the market: they 
get the same price received by the professional traders without having to do 
any of the work of learning the information . . . .”163  
The assumption that the experts are not overloaded, however, is too 
simplistic; indeed, many experts have worried aloud about becoming 
overloaded.164 To be sure, studies show that those with experience and 
expertise are able to search and evaluate information more effectively than 
 162. Nearly $7 trillion is invested through mutual funds in the United States. See Mutual Fund 
Ownership and Shareholder Characteristics 57, at http://www.ici.org/pdf/02fb_datasec_intro.pdf 
(accessed July 26, 2003); see also id. at 37, at http://www.ici.org/pdf/02fb_ch4.pdf (accessed July 26, 
2003).  
 163. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 11. The conventional wisdom is that capital markets 
approximate semi-strong form efficiency, in that they rapidly incorporate publicly-available 
information. The behavioral finance literature, however, raises serious doubts about capital market 
efficiency. See infra Part V.B. 
 164. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. Relying on experts raises other concerns. 
Securities analyst conflicts of interest have received the most attention. See, e.g., Regulation Analyst 
Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8193, 68 Fed. Reg. 4482-01 (Feb. 20, 2003); see also 
supra note 68 (referencing the $1.4 billion global regulatory settlement addressing analyst conflicts). 
In addition, Regulation FD, which generally prohibits companies from disclosing material non-public 
information selectively, represents a bias toward leveling the playing field in the sense of ensuring that 
individual investors have access to the same information that market professionals do. See 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.100-240.103 (2003). In some respects, Regulation FD can be understood as eschewing a policy 
whereby the individual investor is protected by market professionals and the efficiency of capital 
markets. Regulation FD shows a preference for allowing individual investors to protect themselves by 
giving them access to the same information that analysts, money managers, and other experts have 
access to. 
 Of course, some experts are better than others at searching and processing information. Warren 
Buffett comes to mind. For an argument that Warren Buffett exploits the imperfect rationality of 
experts in bringing his own judgment and expertise to bear in evaluating companies, see JAMES 
O’LOUGHLIN, THE REAL WARREN BUFFETT: MANAGING CAPITAL, LEADING PEOPLE (2003). 
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non-experts.165 This is in part because experts, when faced with lots of 
information, are better at determining what to ignore and what to focus on.166 
But this is not to say that experts could not do better with less information in 
some cases. Several studies and experiments show that experts can become 
overloaded, even if they can effectively use more information than non-
experts.167 In terms of the classic inverted-U curve of information overload 
studies,168 we could think of the curve turning down at a higher quantity of 
information for experts than non-experts and with a less steep slope, but it 
 165. See, e.g., Matthew J. Anderson, A Comparative Analysis of Information Search and 
Evaluation Behavior of Professional and Non-Professional Financial Analysts, 13 ACCT., ORG. & 
SOCIETY 431, 434 (1988) (explaining that experts, as compared to non-experts, have more specialized 
knowledge; are better able to store and recall information; and are better able to identify and focus on 
relevant information); Malhotra, Information Load, supra note 111, at 428 (explaining that 
“cognitively complex people” can process more information); James Shanteau, Competence in 
Experts: The Role of Task Characteristics, 53 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 252, 254 
(1992) (citing studies showing that experts perform better than novices in “nearly every aspect of 
cognitive functioning”) [hereinafter Shanteau, Competence in Experts]; Snowball, supra note 111, at 
325-26 (explaining that experience should facilitate the selection and processing of information); 
Simnett, supra note 111, at 702-03 (explaining that experts, as compared to non-experts, “know what 
information to look for”; are better able to retrieve information; organize information better; are better 
at filtering out less salient information; and develop better strategies for coping with large amounts of 
information).  
 166. See Guthrie, supra note 97, at 621 n.111 (citing Ettenson et al., Expert Judgment: Is More 
Information Better?, 60 PSYCHOL. REP. 227, 237 (1987) (finding that the “ability to concentrate on 
what is relevant without necessarily using all available information may differentiate expert decision 
makers from their less-experienced counterparts” and that “the nonuse of information by experts 
reflects ‘skillful omission’ rather than a cognitive limitation”)). This might help explain why the 
market focuses as much as it does on a company’s own earnings estimates. A reasonable heuristic for 
valuing a company in the face of vast amounts of information might be to focus on an available item of 
information like a company’s earnings estimates (which, to be sure, reflect lots of other information).  
 167. See, e.g., Biggs et al., supra note 108, at 983-84 (loan officers engage in contingent decision 
making); Shanteau, Competence in Experts, supra note 165, at 254 (explaining experts are subject to 
the same cognitive limitations as non-experts); James Shanteau, Cognitive Heuristics and Biases in 
Behavioral Auditing: Review, Comments and Observations, 14 ACCT., ORG. & SOCIETY 165, 172-73 
(1989) (explaining that experts are subject to the same biases, and use the same heuristics, as lay 
persons); Simnett, supra note 111 (auditors subject to information overload); see also Hirshleifer & 
Teoh, supra note 123 (summarizing studies showing that capital market professionals suffer from 
limited attention and information processing capabilities). 
 That many experts are asking for more information following recent scandals at Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco, and elsewhere does not validate the more-is-better-than-less view of disclosure or 
suggest that experts are not subject to overload. Rather, the recent calls for additional disclosures 
reflect an understandable desire for better, higher-quality information that is more important to 
investment decisions than much of what is already disclosed. Information overload can accommodate 
a different mix of disclosures. Whatever the level of mandatory disclosure, the most useful (i.e., 
“diagnostic”) information should be disclosed. Indeed, it is likely that we would add certain 
disclosures, even as the disclosure requirements were scaled back as a whole. Cf. Partnoy, supra note 
134 (calling for more disclosure with respect to derivatives). Moreover, the experts might very well be 
suffering from overload, even if they do not recognize it, dealing with vast quantities of information by 
adopting simplifying decision strategies (e.g., financial models) that highlight select information.  
 168. See supra note 112. 
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still curves down at some point.169 This should not be surprising given that 
everybody—experts and non-experts alike—has limited cognitive abilities. A 
vast behavioral finance literature suggests that securities market 
professionals, like lay investors, are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases 
that affect investment decisions.170 Information overload can be thought of as 
reflecting just another cognitive limitation or decision-making bias.  
Undoubtedly, analysts, money managers, brokers, and other experts 
search for ways to use information more effectively. After all, these 
individuals, and the institutions they work at, have real “skin in the game.” 
They have a strong financial incentive to make good decisions when trading 
securities or advising others;171 those who do not make good decisions often 
enough will not survive in the business. In terms of the accuracy-effort 
framework of decision making,172 the additional accuracy might very well be 
worth the additional effort of developing better financial models or simply 
working longer and harder hours.173 Moreover, securities market 
professionals are likely to learn from past mistakes and gain valuable 
experience over time. And if somebody needs support, individuals can be 
engaged to help: people can be hired, resources can be reallocated, and tasks 
can be divided. In large part, the expert filters are in reality collections of 
individuals housed in financial institutions that can bring lots of human and 
other resources to bear on a task.  
Although the risk of information overload may be eased for experts, it is 
not eliminated. The basic premise of information overload still holds—
people, even the smartest professional traders and analysts, have limited 
cognitive capabilities. People also have finite amounts of time and other 
resources. Consequently, there are opportunity costs when an individual (or 
group of individuals) spends more time and effort on certain information or 
on a particular company; less time and effort can be spent on other 
information and other companies.174 Indeed, extensive research finds 
 169. See Simnett, supra note 111, at 703. 
 170. See generally SHILLER, supra note 126; SHLEIFER, supra note 126; Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir 
Statman, Cognitive Biases in Market Forecasts, Fall Volume, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 72 (2000) 
[hereinafter Fisher & Statman]; Hirshleifer, supra note 126; Priya Raghubir & Sanjiv Ranjan Das, The 
Psychology of Investor Decisionmaking: A Case for Theory-Driven Experimental Enquiry, 55 FIN. 
ANAL. J. 56 (1999) [hereinafter Raghubir & Das]; Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 
126; Langevoort, Market Efficiency Revisited, supra note 20. 
 171. Individual investors, of course, also have a strong financial incentive to make good decisions 
when trading securities. 
 172. See supra notes 102-09 and accompanying text. 
 173. However, more effort does not necessarily result in better decisions. Cf. infra notes 178-81 
and accompanying text (discussing “accountability” and decision making). 
 
 174. As Professors Hirshleifer and Teoh put it in the context of their model of limited investor 
attention, “Inattention seems foolish, as inattentive investors lose money by ignoring aspects of the 
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evidence of the persistent mispricing of securities, notwithstanding that 
groups of very smart, highly-motivated experts spend a considerable amount 
of time studying companies and trading securities.175 Although these studies 
do not directly focus on information overload, they suggest that experts, 
notwithstanding their financial incentives and expertise, often get it wrong.176 
Finally, on a more practical level, there are limits to how many people should 
be hired and to the reallocation of resources, and the very process of dividing 
up a task has its own costs and inefficiencies. At some point, the out-of-
pocket and coordination costs outweigh any incremental benefit of bringing 
more resources to bear on a particular matter.177  
However, it is not just that experts are prone to information overload. It is 
possible that experts might actually do worse than non-experts under certain 
circumstances. First is the idea of “accountability.” Psychologists define 
accountability as “the pressure to justify one’s judgments/decisions to 
others.”178 Studies show that when people are held accountable, as one would 
expect market professionals to be, they try to process more information in 
more complex ways.179 Perhaps counterintuitively, this additional effort can 
lead to worse, not better, decisions. Studies show that by trying to evaluate 
more information, individuals who are accountable often overinterpret 
information, focus too much on less relevant information while ignoring key 
(or “diagnostic”) information, and pay too much attention to conflicting 
economic environment. However, if time and attention are costly, such behavior may be reasonable.” 
Hirshleifer & Teoh, supra note 123.  
 175. See supra note 106 and accompanying text; see also infra Part V.B. 
 176. See David Hirshleifer et al., Disclosure to a Credulous Audience: The Role of Limited 
Attention, at http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/2002.htm (accessed July 26, 2003) (explaining 
that evidence of mispricing “is surprising since mispricing in securities markets offers potential profit 
opportunities to smart traders”). For more on the limits of arbitrage to trade away these mispricings, 
see infra note 303.  
 177. See Schwarcz, supra note 134, at 12-17 (explaining that more people can be engaged to help 
digest complex disclosures, but that “the costs involved as well as market imperfections and behavioral 
psychology appear to preclude this from being a complete long-term solution”). 
 178. Steven M. Glover, The Influence of Time Pressure and Accountability on Auditors’ 
Processing of Nondiagnostic Information, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 213, 216 (1997); see also Vicky B. 
Hoffman & James M. Patton, Accountability, the Dilution Effect, and Conservatism in Auditors’ Fraud 
Judgments, 35 J. ACCT. RES. 227, 228-30 (1997); Tetlock & Boettger, supra note 117, at 388; Philip 
E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 286 
(1983) [hereinafter Tetlock]. 
 179. See, e.g., Thomas A. Buchman et al., Accountability and Auditors’ Judgments About 
Contingent Events, 23 J. BUS., FIN. & ACCT. 379, 380 (1996); Glover, supra note 117, at 216; Tetlock 
& Boettger, supra note 117, at 388; Tetlock, supra note 178, at 286-87; see also Timothy D. Wilson & 
Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality of Preferences and 
Decisions, 60 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 182 (1991) (explaining that analyzing 
reasons can focus peoples’ attention on nonoptimal criteria, which can lead to inferior decision 
making). 
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information in anticipation of criticism from the party they are accountable 
to.180 In essence, because people are “trying too hard” or are otherwise 
concerned about justifying their decisions, they might use an overly-
complicated decision process that leads to an inferior result.181 
Another concern with experts is overconfidence. People tend to be 
overconfident in their abilities.182 Not only do people overestimate their 
ability to evaluate information and predict the future based on available data, 
but they also overestimate their abilities as compared to others. Numerous 
studies have documented this overconfidence bias among securities market 
professionals as well as lay investors.183 There is, however, some reason to 
think that experts, particularly those who have had success in the past, might 
be particularly overconfident. First, studies have shown that confidence 
increases with expertise or experience, although there are admittedly studies 
cutting the other way.184 Second, studies show that people who are very 
successful tend to be especially confident in their abilities.185 It is reasonable 
to assume that most securities market professionals—or at least those who 
are most influential or manage the largest funds—have been quite successful 
over their careers, or at least probably view themselves as having been so. A 
third and related point concerns the availability bias. The availability bias is 
the idea that people focus on events that they are able to recall, regardless of 
their actual probabilities.186 As a result, the likelihood of the event happening 
 180. See, e.g., Glover, supra note 117, at 214, 216; Tetlock & Boettger, supra note 117, at 388-89, 
396-97; Tetlock, supra note 178, at 286-87. One benefit of accountability, however, might be to “de-
bias” certain cognitive biases, such as framing effects, the availability heuristic, first impressions, or 
overoptimism, by motivating the decision maker to think more critically about the information and her 
decision. See, e.g., Tetlock & Boettger, supra note 167, at 388; Tetlock, supra note 178, at 286. 
 181. Not only experts are accountable. But it is reasonable to think of experts as being accountable 
for their investment decisions and recommendations in a way that a lay person is not accountable when 
investing, for example, to his or her spouse or family. 
 182. See Fisher & Statman, supra note 170, at 3; Hirshleifer, supra note 126, at 1548; Langevoort, 
Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126, at 145-47; Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too 
Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1907, 1976 n.138 (2002); Raghubir & Das, supra note 170, at 69; SHILLER, supra note 126, at 
142-46; Prentice, supra note 125, at 1457-61 & n.296 (collecting citations).  
 183. See, e.g., supra note 126. 
 184. See, e.g., Simon Gervais & Terrance Odean, Learning to Be Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1 (2001) (showing that confidence increases in the early stages of a trader’s career and then 
decreases as the trader becomes more experienced) [hereinafter Gervais & Odean]; Thomas I. Selling, 
Confidence and Information Usage: Evidence from a Bankruptcy Prediction Task, 5 BEHAV. RES. IN 
ACCT. 237, 248 (1993) (experiment showing that MBA students became more confident in their ability 
to predict bankruptcy from accounting data as they gained experience).  
 185. See, e.g., Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126, at 146 n.50 (citing Gervais 
& Odean, supra note 184). 
 
 186. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World 
Coherence in Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (2002); Cass Sunstein, Probability 
Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 64 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein]. 
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may be overestimated in the person’s decision-making process if it is readily 
available in the person’s memory.187 It is possible, for example, that a money 
manager, analyst, or arbitrageur who has been successful, especially if 
recently successful, will focus on her successes and overestimate the 
likelihood that her success will continue and, as a result, become overly 
confident in her own abilities.188 Finally, it turns out that more information 
often contributes to the overconfidence bias, even when the quality of the 
decision might be deteriorating because of information overload.189 Experts, 
then, might be particularly prone to overconfidence since they typically have 
access to more information than individual investors, for example, as a result 
of private conversations with management (Regulation FD 
notwithstanding190) or rank-and-file employees and analyst conference calls.  
After all is said and done, we might learn that the expert filters—because 
they have greater ability and incentive to “get it right”—make very good 
investing decisions in the face of vast quantities of information and that 
reducing the level of disclosure would not meaningfully improve their 
decisions. Even under these circumstances, a reduction in disclosure would 
be worth considering, assuming we were not on the upward slope of the 
inverted-U curve of information overload studies. The very reason experts 
can do well in an environment saturated with information is often because 
they adopt less complicated decision strategies that enable them to focus their 
efforts on more relevant data and ignore less useful information.191 Professor 
Jacoby, one of the leaders in studying information overload and decision 
making, writes that “[r]esearch shows that, operating under conditions that 
have both financial and ego consequences and where information acquisition 
costs are virtually zero, even professional security analysts deciding on 
which securities to select do not acquire most (or even much) of the 
information available.”192 I am confident, for example, that much of what is 
 187. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 186, at 64-65.  
 188. See Kim D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 OR. 
L. REV. 301, 315 (2000); Prentice, supra note 125, at 1460-61; see also Snowball, supra note 111, at 
325-26 (explaining that past experiences heavily influence predictions). 
 189. See, e.g., Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, reprinted in Kahneman 
et al., supra note 90; A. Rashad Abdel-Khalik, The Effect of Aggregating Accounting Reports on the 
Quality of the Lending Decision: An Empirical Investigation, J. ACCT. RES. 104 (1973) (explaining 
that research shows that more information increases confidence); Dane K. Peterson & Gordon F. Pitz, 
Confidence, Uncertainty, and the Use of Information, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 85 (1988); 
Simnett, supra note 111, at 715; Zacharakis & Meyer, supra note 123, at 331. 
 190. See supra note 164. 
 191. See supra notes 165-70. 
 192. Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer Rationality? Some Consumer 
Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 66-67 (N.Y. Univ. Ctr. For Law & Bus., 
working paper #CLB-00-009, 2000) (citing Jacob Jacoby et al., Effectiveness of Security Analysts 
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presently disclosed goes largely unused. If information is not being used, 
why require that it be disclosed? Information is costly to disclose because of 
transaction costs and the increased risk of liability under the federal securities 
laws for the issuer and its directors and officers when mandatory disclosure 
requirements are stringent. In order to reduce the cost of capital, it might 
make sense to rationalize disclosure requirements by deleting required 
disclosures that do not meaningfully contribute to the investment decision of 
experts.193 The difficulty, of course, is determining what items to delete. If 
useful items are deleted, the experts might do worse with less information. 
Complicating matters, as the following discussion suggests, not every expert 
wants or uses the same information. 
2. What to Disclose?  
This raises a more fundamental question: To whom should the federal 
mandatory disclosure system be directed? These questions have significant 
consequences for any attempt to cut back on the level of disclosure. Simply, 
we would need to determine what required disclosures to delete. The broad 
emphasis of information overload, and the psychology of investing in 
general, is that the user of the information matters. There are many diverse 
users of the information that the federal securities laws require to be 
disclosed. As one scholar put it, “The user is a shadowy figure at best.”194 
The users of the information include small individual investors, arbitrageurs, 
securities analysts, money managers, brokers, and financial advisers, to name 
a few. Different users have different amounts of expertise, experience, time, 
training, and sophistication and probably different decision strategies.195 
Accordingly, they use information differently and have different capacities to 
search and process information. Although it might seem easier to answer the 
question of “what to disclose?” if we focus on experts, not all experts are the 
same. An arbitrageur who has been running a hedge fund for years is 
probably going to use information differently from a mid-level buy-side 
analyst. Furthermore, different users will have different investment strategies, 
Information Accessing Strategies: A Computer Interactive Assessment, 1 COMPUTERS & HUM. BEHAV. 
95, 95-113 (1985)). 
 193. There is some precedent for this approach. See Disclosure Simplification Task Force Report, 
supra note 74. 
 194. John P. Fertakis, On Communication, Understanding, and Relevance in Accounting 
Reporting, 44 ACCT. REV. 680, 683  (1969). 
 195. See, e.g., PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 33 (“A person’s repertoire of strategies may 
depend upon many factors, such as cognitive development, experience, and more formal training and 
education.”); Snowball, supra note 111, at 324 (discussing interactions between user expertise and 
information load). 
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portfolios, risk tolerances, and techniques for valuing securities, leading them 
to use different information in making investment decisions. Complicating 
things, the information a person finds most useful in evaluating a company 
will likely vary over time as changes take place within the company or its 
industry and as macroeconomic factors evolve. In short, different users will 
focus on different information, even if there is a core set of information that 
all (or at least most) users want and use. More importantly, different users 
can be expected to become overloaded at different points and to different 
extents.196  
It is hard to know what information each user should have in order to 
make effective investment choices.197 Without knowing what disclosure 
items to delete, scaling back disclosure is imprudent; more harm than good 
might be done if companies were no longer required to disclose certain key 
information.198 Even if less is disclosed overall, the mix of information that is 
disclosed still matters. With some additional empirical research, it is possible 
to gain insight into how different market participants use different 
information in making investment decisions.199 The SEC’s Advisory 
Committee on Corporate Disclosure made an effort in the 1970s to address 
this question by studying how a number of market participants used 
disclosures.200 But knowing how people use information in making 
investment decisions begs a second question: Assuming disclosure 
requirements are going to be scaled back, to which user should disclosure be 
tailored? As suggested above, it is unlikely that the same disclosures will be 
optimal across all securities market participants.  
An exhaustive consideration of options for how to tailor the federal 
disclosure system is beyond this Article’s scope. Nonetheless, a few options 
merit brief mentioning. First, disclosure could be tailored to the median user 
of the information. This might be a good enough approximation of what each 
user needs to enable all users to do well enough. Second, disclosure could be 
tailored to the experts, whose trades and analyses are the key determinants of 
 196. Cf. Michael J. Driver & Theodore J. Mock, Human Information Processing, Decision Style 
Theory, and Accounting Information Systems, 52 ACCT. REV. 490, 490 (1975) (“These results also 
indicate that the utility of a particular type of information cannot be effectively evaluated apart from 
the users of that information. There may be little point in providing financial forecast data or human 
resource accounting data to administrators whose cognitive makeup is such that they ignore it.”). 
 197. Further, just because an investor demands certain information, it does not necessarily follow 
that the investor will make a better decision with the information than without it. 
 198. This information, of course, could be disclosed voluntarily under market pressure. 
 199. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text for a proposed research agenda. At least when 
it comes to a core set of information, I think there would be widespread agreement over what 
information (nearly) every investor or expert would want. Quality financial statements come to mind.  
 200. See SEC Advisory Committee Report, supra note 15.  
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security prices. It is worth noting, however, that the SEC, in adopting 
Regulation FD, expressed significant regard for the individual investor, even 
at the risk of less overall disclosure and less efficient capital markets.201 In 
the spirit of Regulation FD, then, a third option is to tailor disclosure to 
(unsophisticated) individual investors. This, however, might compromise 
capital market efficiency if it denies the expert filters key information that 
they can process without being overloaded, although analysts and other 
experts could always pressure management for additional disclosures. A 
fourth possibility is a tiered disclosure system. For example, one set of 
disclosures could be available to experts, and a different set of disclosures 
could be available to lay investors.202 The tiered-disclosure approach is 
consistent, at least in broad terms, with Professor Choi’s recent proposal for 
investor regulation as opposed to issuer regulation.203 Professor Choi 
proposes that investors take a test designed to evidence their level of investor 
sophistication. Depending on how well an investor does on the exam, his 
investment choices would be limited. The better an investor does on the 
exam, the more investing options he would have. A final option would be to 
do nothing. Given the uncertainty of making any significant change, the 
present system might adequately satisfy most investors’ needs without 
overloading them too much. In this case, minor modification might be 
worthwhile, but no wholesale regulatory overhaul.  
Three other difficulties complicate any decision to delete disclosures. 
First, the entire process of regulatory change suggested here is subject to an 
array of well-known public choice pressures.204 Indeed, the SEC itself has 
been subject to public choice critiques.205 Second, policymakers are 
themselves boundedly rational and subject to cognitive biases, so it is not 
certain that they will evaluate the options for regulatory change in a way that 
will lead to a better result than the present system. More harm than good 
might be done if the regulators make mistakes in scaling back the disclosure 
 201. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, 53 SEC 
Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000). 
 202. For a more specific suggestion along these lines, see infra notes 286-91 and accompanying 
text. 
 203. See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 279 (2000). For an interesting critique of Choi’s proposal grounded in behavioral finance, see 
Prentice, supra note 125. 
 204. See generally PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); PUBLIC 
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Maxwell L. Stearns ed., 1997). 
 205. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group 
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (1994). Although beyond this 
Article’s scope, a public choice problem might explain why the mandatory disclosure system is as 
extensive and demanding as it currently is.  
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system.206 Third, just as it is hard to know how people use information, it is 
difficult to know for sure how investors might respond to a regulatory change 
calling for less disclosure. For example, such a change could erode investor 
confidence as investors become concerned that the federal securities laws are 
not adequately policing issuers.207  
The upshot of the foregoing is simply that, assuming the policy decision 
is made to scale back the mandatory disclosure system, operationalizing this 
policy choice, in terms of deciding what disclosure requirements to delete, is 
itself a difficult regulatory challenge. 
3. Other Goals of the Federal Securities Laws  
Concerns about information overload might ultimately impact the 
trajectory of securities regulation, with the SEC becoming more hesitant to 
expand disclosure requirements or possibly deciding to delete certain 
disclosure items.208 Indeed, as noted above, there is increasing concern, even 
from the SEC, about the quantity of disclosure. I believe that the SEC should 
be open to the possibility of scaling back disclosure requirements. However, 
even if the empirical data on investor psychology and decision making 
sustain the case for less disclosure, and the SEC is able to determine how 
most effectively to scale back what should be disclosed, there is still more to 
consider before revamping our mandatory disclosure system or even 
changing the “more is better” tenor of the federal securities laws. 
The goal of less disclosure as suggested here is to promote better investor 
decision making by avoiding information overload. Earlier, however, I 
overstated the case for informed investor decision making as the goal of the 
federal securities laws. To be sure, informed investor decision making is a 
key goal of the federal securities laws, probably the main goal today. But it is 
not the only goal. Two other goals are reducing agency costs and promoting 
investor confidence. A third function of the federal securities laws, which we 
might call “solving the lemons problem,” has also been offered as a goal of 
 206. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 157. 
 207. For a more detailed discussion of investor confidence, see infra notes 233-45 and 
accompanying text. 
 208. In its report to the SEC, the Disclosure Simplification Task Force recommended that the SEC 
delete certain immaterial disclosure requirements that were cluttering-up SEC filings. See Disclosure 
Simplification Task Force Report, supra note 74. Cutting back disclosure in response to information 
overload, however, would argue for deleting not only immaterial information from SEC filings but 
more important information as well.  
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the disclosure system.209 Reducing disclosure might be contrary to these 
goals, even if it means better investment decisions.210  
a. Reducing Agency Costs 
One purpose of the federal securities laws is to reduce agency costs.211 
The argument is that disclosure has a prophylactic effect by deterring 
corporate insiders from engaging in fraudulent or corrupt behavior or 
mismanagement that comes at the expense of various corporate 
constituencies, investors being the most important for purposes of the federal 
securities laws. As such, disclosure serves an important corporate governance 
function. The logic has been expressed quite colorfully over the years. A.A. 
Sommer drew the following analogy: “Very simply put, if every instance of 
adultery had to be disclosed, there would probably be less adultery.”212 And 
Louis Loss put it this way: “People who are forced to undress in public will 
presumably pay some attention to their figures.”213 William O. Douglas 
contributed the following: “[T]he terroristic phases of the [Securities] Act are 
dominant. Real protection is afforded investors by scaring other people.”214 
But Louis Brandeis gave us perhaps the most famous statement expressing 
the role of disclosure in deterring corporate misconduct: “Publicity is justly 
 209. See Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of 
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002) [hereinafter Rock]. 
 210. Disclosure is typically thought to promote each of these goals, avoiding any need for policy 
makers to choose among them. However, once information overload is factored in, these goals might 
be at odds. In particular, more information might promote investor confidence, help reduce agency 
costs, and solve the lemons problem, but might frustrate investor decision making once the 
information load reaches a certain point.  
 211. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1047, 1051-52, 1080, 1109-10 (1995); 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 173; JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 39-40 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION]; Alison Grey Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities 
Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 319-20, 324, 330 (1974); John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective 
Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1114, 1247, 1251, 1266 (1977); Merritt B. Fox, Required 
Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (1999) [hereinafter Fox]; 
Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 874-75 
(1995); Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What 
You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996) [hereinafter Lowenstein]; Sommer, supra note 15, at 
72, 263, 264, 266; Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1210-23 (1999) [hereinafter Williams]. 
 212. Sommer, supra note 15, at 266-67. 
 213. LOSS, supra note 72, at 33. 
 214. Douglas, supra note 71, at 526. Douglas, however, was ultimately skeptical that disclosure 
would be effective in deterring corporate corruption and misconduct. See 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra 
note 16, at 173. 
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commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to 
be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”215 
Two disclosure items of particular note when it comes to reducing agency 
costs are Item 402 of Regulation S-K (dealing with executive compensation) 
and Item 404 of Regulation S-K (dealing with conflict-of-interest 
transactions).216 These disclosures have less to do with valuing the company 
and more to do with deterring insider misconduct or mismanagement, 
although there is some overlap between the goal of reducing agency costs 
and informed investor decision making. As Professor Langevoort has 
stressed, the valuation of a company depends, at least in part, on assessing 
the management team and the risk of corporate misconduct or 
mismanagement.217  
Shaming is a modern variation of this agency cost rationale of 
disclosure.218 The strategy of shaming is premised on actively using 
disclosure to influence corporate conduct, instead of passively relying on the 
deterrent effect of SEC disclosures. Institutional investors and large 
shareholders increasingly employ a strategy of shaming directors and 
officers, in part because shareholders have almost no de jure control over 
how the corporation is run on a day-to-day basis.219 For example, one 
frequently sees full-page advertisements in the New York Times or the Wall 
Street Journal exhorting management to adopt some course of conduct or 
vilifying management for having engaged in some ill-advised behavior. The 
decision of Jack Welch, the long-time CEO and chairman of General 
Electric, to give back much of his severance package in the face of the 
public’s outcry over what it saw as an excessive and outlandish deal for 
Welch is a good example of the power of shaming.220 Along similar lines, 
 215. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914). 
 216. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 211, at 1344; Mahoney, supra note 14, at 1051, 1054, 1080, 
1109-11; Seligman, Historical Need, supra note 11, at 45-51; Williams, supra note 211, at 1222. 
 217. Donald C. Langevoort, Managing the “Expectations Gap” in Investor Protection: The SEC 
and the Post-Enron Reform Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1152 (2003) [hereinafter Langevoort, 
Expectations Gap] (“These [goals] are inseparable insofar as a valuation decision is impossible 
without an assessment of the risk that incumbent management will divert to itself the otherwise 
expected stream of earnings . . . . Management integrity, or fear of mismanagement, are both 
legitimate concerns that are part and parcel of the valuation process . . . .”). 
 218. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001) 
[hereinafter Skeel]. Indeed, many have concluded that disclosure deters certain conduct because of the 
associated embarrassment if the behavior were known by the public. See SELIGMAN, 
TRANSFORMATION, supra note 211, at 40 (explaining that disclosure deters “embarrassing activities”); 
Coffee, supra note 211, at 1266 (explaining that disclosure increases “embarrassment costs”). 
 219. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 218. 
 220. See Carol Hymowitz, In the Lead: Investors Have to Lead the Charge to Keep Big Bosses in 
Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at B1. 
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shareholders could use the shareholder proposal process to express their 
views to corporate insiders, even if management is not obligated to follow 
the shareholders’ recommendation. This at least sends management a 
message and puts the directors and officers in the position of having to 
publicly reject the expressed will of the shareholders, something that is not 
always easy to do in bright sunlight.  
In addition to deterring undesirable conduct because it is embarrassing or 
will lead to public outcry if uncovered, disclosure might influence 
managerial behavior in a more subtle way. Professor Louis Lowenstein has 
argued that disclosure requires directors and officers to focus on aspects of 
their own conduct and corporate performance that might otherwise go 
unnoticed.221 Professor Lowenstein goes on to suggest that by forcing 
insiders to confront “disagreeable realities” about the business “early on and 
in detail,”222 the process of disclosure might bring the directors and officers 
to a level of self-awareness about how the company is being run that will 
result in steps to improve corporate performance.223 Similarly, it may 
encourage the management team to keep doing what has worked, while 
shunning what has not. Professors Thompson and Sale have made a cognate 
point, revealing in an interesting study that securities fraud class actions often 
focus on how the business has been operated, in effect regulating corporate 
managers by subjecting them and their business decisions to greater scrutiny, 
forcing the management team to justify the company’s performance.224  
Behavioral law and economics might have something to add along these 
lines. Studies show that people often act in the best interest of others, and not 
in their own narrow self-interest like homo economicus.225 It is at least 
 221. See Lowenstein, supra note 211; see also Fox, supra note 211, at 123-25 (supporting 
Professor Lowenstein’s reasoning). 
 222. Lowenstein, supra note 211, at 1342. 
 223. Id. at 1342-52. Professor Fox has done a good job summarizing Lowenstein’s position:  
Professor Louis Lowenstein has argued that required disclosure can improve managerial 
performance simply by forcing managers to become more aware of reality. . . . When managers 
have the legal obligation to disclose certain information, they may have to gather and analyze 
information they would otherwise ignore. The proposition that this consciousness raising will lead 
to an improvement in shareholder welfare rests on two assumptions. First, without required 
disclosure, management will not gather and analyze all of the information that could, in a cost-
effective fashion, help it pursue its own objective function. Second, the managerial objective 
function is sufficiently congruent with the best interests of shareholders so that if management, 
because of required disclosure, determines how to better pursue its objective function, the actions 
it will take will also improve shareholder welfare. Both assumptions, though debatable, are 
plausible. 
Fox, supra note 211, at 123-24.  
 224. Thompson & Sale, supra note 17. 
 225. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 
31 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 31-32 (2002); Lynn Stout, Other-Regarding Preferences and Social Norms (Mar.  
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possible that other-regarding behavior could be encouraged by putting 
management in a position to focus on how it is running the business and how 
the business is impacting various corporate constituencies. Requiring 
management to prepare wide-ranging disclosures might do this, as 
Lowenstein suggests.226  
A related concern arises from the expressive function of law.227 The view 
that law can serve an expressive function contends that, above and beyond 
imposing sanctions, the law can make a statement about how people are 
supposed to behave—that is, it can express certain social values—and 
thereby shape norms of conduct, although there is disagreement on the 
process by which the norm change occurs.228 In discussing the expressive 
aspects of regulation, Professor Sunstein has said: “These expressive or 
symbolic dimensions are central in many regulatory contexts. They are just 
as real and significant as other dimensions of policy. Part of what policy-
making does is to define, interpret, and create collective understandings and 
values.”229 Whatever else one might think about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it 
expresses that fraud and other corporate misconduct should not be 
countenanced. Indeed, the Securities Act and the Exchange Act sent a similar 
message when adopted, setting the tone, according to some, for a new era of 
“financial morality.”230 Scaling back disclosure requirements might send the 
wrong message. It might signal that fraud and other corporate misconduct, or 
even simply aggressive accounting, is acceptable, or at least tolerated more 
2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=265902; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, 
Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735 
(2001).  
 226. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text. 
 227. Professor Prentice has made arguments similar to the following based on the expressive 
function of the federal securities laws in criticizing Professor Choi’s investor regulation proposal. See 
Prentice, supra note 125, at 1502-06. 
 228. For example, some argue that people internalize norms of behavior. Others argue that law’s 
expressive function works by shaming people into behaving in accordance with the expressed social 
value. Still others argue that norms are the product of a coordination game wherein individuals 
gravitate in their play to a particular focal point, which becomes the norm. Finally, others argue that 
norms develop as people take steps to signal that they are “good types” in order to coordinate future 
interactions. The reality is that everybody is probably right to some extent. For different views of the 
expressive function of law, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of 
Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and 
Economics, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 585 (1998); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 
88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1649 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein].  
 229. Sunstein, supra note 228, at 70. 
 230. SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 211, at 178-79; see also Prentice, supra note 125, 
at 1503. 
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by regulators than previously thought.231 This, in turn, might encourage more 
fraud and misconduct, increasing agency costs, which would not be the goal 
of relaxing disclosure obligations. Even “legitimate” actors might begin to 
engage in aggressive practices that push the envelope, testing the boundaries 
of acceptable behavior.232  
At bottom, even if scaling back disclosure promotes informed investor 
decision making, it might nonetheless compromise the goal of reducing 
agency costs.  
b. Boosting Investor Confidence 
Boosting investor confidence is another goal of the federal securities 
laws.233 Investor confidence is important to getting people to invest and, 
accordingly, important to the thickness and efficiency of capital markets. The 
corporate scandals hit investor confidence hard, partly evidenced by the 
significant withdrawals investors made from the stock market and their 
hesitancy to put in new money. Investors have lost confidence in directors 
and officers, in securities market professionals, and in the regulatory system. 
The need to restore confidence has motivated the recent regulatory and 
legislative responses to corporate scandal.  
Investors’ belief that they have access to enough information to make 
informed investment decisions is certainly an important part of investor 
confidence. In fact, as discussed earlier, some studies show that at some 
point, investors can become overconfident with more information.234 But 
 231. Cf. Prentice, supra note 125, at 1503 (criticizing Choi’s investor regulation proposal as 
“tak[ing] the securities industry in the wrong direction” by creating a more permissive regulatory 
environment that makes fraud “more acceptable and therefore more likely to occur”). 
 232. Cf. id. at 1504 (“When the Reagan administration adopted a deregulatory attitude, traders on 
Wall Street adopted shady practices they previously had abjured.”). Since there is no consensus on 
what accounts for the expressive function of law or the process by which norms of conduct respond to 
“statements” of social values, one has to be careful about overstating the expressive function of more 
disclosure as compared to less. Indeed, it is possible that, in response to a relaxed regulatory regime, 
investors and securities market professionals will fill the void by becoming more vigilant and more 
skeptical—in other words, that the market will respond by policing companies more carefully.  
 233. See KRIPKE, supra note 11, at 28; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 692 (“The 
justification most commonly offered for mandatory disclosure rules is that they are necessary to 
‘preserve confidence’ in the capital markets. It is said that investors, especially small and 
unsophisticated ones, withdraw their capital to the detriment of the markets and the economy as a 
whole when they fear that they may be exploited by the firms or better-informed traders. Disclosure 
rules both deter fraud and equalize ‘access’ to information, restoring the necessary confidence.”); 
Seligman, Historical Need, supra note 11, at 51-53 (disclosure helps reduce “investors’ concerns that 
they could be defrauded or treated unfairly and help facilitate an increased level of corporate securities 
sales”); 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 187; see also Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 
152; Frankel, supra note 152. 
 234. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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there is another aspect to investor confidence, namely, the general conviction 
investors have—or at least had—that the regulatory system provides 
adequate investor protection and ensures capital market integrity, above and 
beyond investors’ ability to make informed decisions. In this view, a 
demanding mandatory disclosure system with active enforcement and severe 
civil and criminal penalties can promote investor confidence.235 In short, a 
stringent regulatory regime shows the investing public, as well as market 
professionals, that there is a cop on the beat and gives them comfort that 
companies are not withholding key information. Conversely, a regulatory 
regime that is perceived as too lax, such as might be the case if mandatory 
disclosure requirements were eased, might undermine investor confidence in 
the regulatory system and, ultimately, in the integrity of capital markets. This 
might be a particular concern if investors see the scaling back of disclosure 
obligations as one of many deregulatory steps.236 Interestingly, investor 
confidence might be eroded even if the quality of investor decision making 
improves in the face of less disclosure. The most important impact of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the recent SEC rulemaking might not be the 
substantive changes they bring about for securities regulation, but that these 
legislative and regulatory responses have helped restore investor 
confidence.237 For example, the August 2002 certifications by CEOs and 
CFOs certifying company financials overlapped with existing requirements 
that directors and officers sign SEC filings.238 Nonetheless, these 
certifications seemed to instill a renewed sense of confidence in the integrity 
of financial statements.  
But there are even two sides to investor confidence. As already discussed, 
 235. See William W. Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's 
Duty of Loyalty, reprinted in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); 
Prentice, supra note 125, at 1500-01 (discussing the role of legal sanctions in bolstering trust in capital 
markets); Frankel, supra note 152, at 3-5 (explaining that regulation can promote investor trust in 
capital markets); Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting: Comparing Benefits, Cost and Risk, at 25 
(Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 99-12, 1999), at http://www.bu.edu/law/ 
faculty/papers (accessed July 26, 2003). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 
576-84 (arguing that law can destroy trust) [hereinafter Ribstein]. 
 236. This “slippery-slope” concern has particular salience today, given several relatively recent 
securities law developments that have reduced the risk of fraud liability for companies and their 
officers, directors, lawyers, underwriters, and accountants. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002). Sarbanes-
Oxley and the recent flurry of SEC rules, of course, would be a counterpoint to any perceived 
deregulatory trend. 
 237. See Frankel, supra note 152, at 3-4 (explaining that public hearings and new legislation 
signal to investors that Congress is “doing something” to protect them).  
 238. Commission Order No. 4-460, Order Requiring the Filing of Sworn Statements Pursuant to 
Section 21(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (June 27, 2002). 
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there is a risk of investor overconfidence.239 Second, there is a risk that trust 
and confidence will turn into complacency.240 There is reason to suspect that 
this is exactly what happened during the bull market of the 1990s, setting the 
stage for the corporate scandals that came to light in 2001 and 2002. Take 
Enron. There were a number of signs in Enron’s SEC filings warning of 
corporate misconduct, but, with very few exceptions, nobody, including the 
expert filters, asked the tough questions one might have hoped for.241 For a 
disclosure-based regulatory regime to work, people need to be diligent and 
vigilant and have a healthy skepticism of what they are being told. The Cold 
War motto, “trust, but verify,” comes to mind. The risk of complacency 
heightens if investors assume that the regulatory regime provides enough 
protection so that they do not need to watch out for themselves.242 As 
Professor Langevoort has pointed out, investors often assume that the federal 
securities laws provide more investor protection than the laws really do: 
“[S]ecurities regulation is far from any assurance of corporate transparency, 
delivering neither as much protection as many investors assume nor as much 
as is optimal.”243 For example, few people knew, or if they knew did not 
focus on, the infrequency with which the SEC has historically reviewed SEC 
filings and that it had not reviewed Enron since 1997, or that the SEC has, by 
many accounts, been significantly under-funded and under-staffed in recent 
years. Langevoort terms this the “expectations gap,” which he suggests the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act has helped fill,244 although it is unclear whether the new 
legislation will live up to its expectations. There is a real risk, especially on 
the heels of the recent corporate scandals, that relaxing disclosure 
requirements would erode investor confidence. At the very least, such 
deregulatory steps probably would not do anything to restore confidence. 
Today, restoring confidence might be the most important thing the SEC and 
Congress can do, just as it was the top priority during the crisis of confidence 
following the 1929 stock market crash.245 
 239. See supra notes 182-90 and accompanying text. 
 240. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 24-25 (2003). 
 241. Of course, one reason the tough questions might not have been asked is because the 
gatekeepers, most notably securities analysts, were afraid of upsetting management for fear of losing 
other business, such as lucrative investment banking or underwriting business. 
 242. Ribstein, supra note 235, at 25. If complacency settles in, the market will have a hard time 
regulating itself, undermining the position of those who advocate market-based, not regulatory- or 
legislative-based, solutions to corporate and accounting scandals. For a thoughtful discussion of 
market-based responses to recent scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and elsewhere, see Ribstein, supra 
note 235.  
 243. Langevoort, Expectations Gap, supra note 217, at 1140. 
 244. Id.  
 
 245. The claims here about investor confidence are modest. It is hard to know for sure how 
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c. The Lemons Problem 
In a seminal article, George Akerlof shows that in a market with 
informational asymmetries, where sellers know more than buyers about the 
products or services being sold, sellers have an incentive to offer inferior 
products.246 Under these circumstances, the challenge for buyers is to identify 
quality, which buyers have difficulty doing without the necessary 
information to distinguish between superior and inferior items or the ability 
otherwise to determine quality at a reasonable cost.247 As a result, according 
to Akerlof, a market for lemons develops, in which inferior items (lemons) 
are sold and buyers withdraw.248  
Although Akerlof famously focuses on the used car market, the lemons 
problem can be extended to securities.249 The stock market collapse of 2001 
and 2002 following the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and 
elsewhere illustrates the point. After these scandals came to light, investors 
began to discount stocks as a whole because of corporate governance 
concerns. Investors were unable to discern the honest, well-run (i.e., “good”) 
companies from the dishonest, poorly-run (i.e., “bad”) ones, and so punished 
all companies indiscriminately, even those with good, honest management 
teams. The August 2002 CEO and CFO financial statement certifications250 
helped solve the lemons problem that a few (perhaps a bushel of) bad apples 
created.  
More generally, there will always be “good” companies and “bad” 
companies. The task for “good” companies is to signal to investors that they 
investor confidence—a product of investor psychology—is created or destroyed. Accordingly, it is 
hard to predict how investor confidence will be affected by more or less regulation.  
 246. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
 247. Id. at 495. 
 248. Akerlof explains it this way: 
The presence of people in the market who are willing to offer inferior goods tends to drive the 
market out of existence—as in the case of our automobile “lemons.” It is this possibility that 
represents the major costs of dishonesty—for dishonest dealings tend to drive honest dealings out 
of the market. There may be potential buyers of good quality products and there may be potential 
sellers of such products in the appropriate price range; however, the presence of people who wish 
to pawn bad wares as good wares tends to drive out the legitimate business. The cost of 
dishonesty, therefore, lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also 
must include the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence. 
Id. at 495. 
 249. See Stout, An Introduction to New Finance, supra note 128, at 9-10; Prentice, supra note 
125, at 1504-05 n.515; see also Schwarcz, supra note 134, at 25-38 (discussing the lemons problem in 
the context of Enron and complex disclosures of securitizations and derivative transactions).  
 250. See supra note 238. 
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are, in fact, good.251 But for the signal to work, it has to be believable and 
hard to make; it cannot readily be mimicked by “bad” companies. Professor 
Ed Rock has recently explained that the federal securities laws provide 
issuers with the means of credibly committing to provide comprehensive, 
quality, and truthful disclosures indefinitely.252 He argues that this 
commitment is important because investors want assurances that they will 
have access to the information necessary to value a company’s securities.253 
But this credible commitment to disclosure can also help solve the lemons 
problem. Three aspects of the disclosure system are particularly important. 
First, the disclosure system is voluntary in the sense that the disclosure 
obligations are not triggered until the issuer goes public.254 Second, the 
mandatory disclosure obligations are extensive and demanding; compliance 
is costly. Third, having opted in as an issuer, the risk of liability—whether 
civil sanctions pursued by the SEC, criminal sanctions pursued by the 
Department of Justice, or private lawsuits—for failure to comply is high, 
especially post-Sarbanes-Oxley. In short, the commitment to disclose under 
the federal securities laws is credible, and because of the stringent disclosure 
requirements, not every company is willing or able to make the commitment. 
As a result, companies that voluntarily opt in to the mandatory disclosure 
system by going public are able to signal that they are “good,” thereby 
helping investors distinguish between “good” and “bad” companies.255 Put 
 251. For a discussion of signaling, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 
122-58 (1998); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 
154-59 (1992); A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRING AND 
RELATED PROCESSES (1974); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1781, 1786-91 (2000). 
 252. Rock, supra note 209, at 686-87 (explaining that the mandatory disclosure system “provides 
a credible and specialized enforcement mechanism, which warrants both the comprehensiveness and 
quality of the information disclosed,” with the risk of civil and criminal sanctions making the 
commitment credible and limitations on exit making the commitment to disclosure “indefinite”). 
 253. Id. at 685. 
 254. Id. at 678. The voluntariness of opting into the federal securities laws is somewhat 
overstated. An issuer may have no real choice but to opt in to raise needed capital and has no choice if 
it exceeds certain thresholds in terms of total assets and number of shareholders. 
 255. Cf. Posner, supra note 251, at 1786-91 (offering a model of tax compliance in which people 
comply with the tax law in order to signal that they are “good types” with low discount rates who are 
likely to cooperate and thus less likely to cheat). A company’s failure to comply with the federal 
securities laws, having opted in, might also signal that a company is “bad,” which could have serious 
consequences for the company’s stock price and ability to raise capital. See Posner, supra note 251, at 
1789-90 (explaining that people avoid “bad types”). 
 
 Professor Rock’s analysis has a different focus. Rock sees the federal securities laws as providing 
companies with a mechanism for credibly committing to investors to provide high-quality, 
comprehensive disclosure for the indefinite future. Rock, supra note 209, at 688-91. My focus is on 
the role the federal securities laws play in providing companies with a means of signaling that they are 
honest and well-run. Another way companies signal that they are “good” is by renting the reputation of 
reputational intermediaries, for example by hiring top law firms or engaging well-respected 
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differently, the fact that a company is willing and able to comply with the 
federal securities laws is itself useful information for investors—in addition 
to what is disclosed in SEC filings.256 More generally, the mere fact of 
complying with the law, whether the securities laws or other legal 
requirements, might signal that a company is “good.”  
Because a commitment is an effective signal only if it is costly for “bad” 
companies to make, scaling back the mandatory disclosure system could 
undermine its signaling function and its usefulness in solving the lemons 
problem in capital markets. If the disclosure obligations were less 
demanding, or even if enforcement were more lax or the sanctions for 
noncompliance were less severe, the signals sent by the companies who opt 
in to the regime might be less meaningful to investors because it would be 
easier for “bad” companies to mimic the behavior of “good” companies by 
credibly committing to comply with the federal securities laws.257 For this 
reason, one might expect “good” companies to prefer a stringent disclosure 
regime.258 If investors cannot distinguish “good” companies from “bad” 
companies, they are likely to protect themselves by demanding a discount for 
all securities or simply withdrawing from the market.259  
V. THE REGULATORY FIX AND SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EFFICIENT 
CAPITAL MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
Where does this leave us? A number of concerns would need to be 
addressed before significantly scaling back the federal mandatory disclosure 
underwriters. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified 
Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001).  
 It is certainly possible for a company to agree contractually to stringent disclosure requirements, 
and the risk of being held liable for fraud or breach of contract might make the commitment credible. 
However, the risk of civil or criminal sanctions pursued by the SEC or the Department of Justice, on 
top of private lawsuits for fraud and breach of contract, makes the commitment to disclose by opting in 
to the federal securities law regime more credible than a contractual commitment to disclose. Rock, 
supra note 209, at 686-87, 696.  
 256. To be sure, this “signaling” story is imperfect. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global 
Crossing, and other companies riddled with corporate scandal were all public companies, subject to the 
federal securities laws. 
 257. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 605 (explaining that stringent legislation makes it 
more costly for low-quality producers to mimic the behavior of high-quality producers). 
 258. Id. (explaining that “trade associations that are dominated by high quality firms often lobby 
for more stringent legislative standards and greater enforcement of those standards” in order to drive 
lemons from the market) (emphasis in original). 
 259. See Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 152, at 9-10 (“Inadequate fraud rules supposedly 
harm companies because when investors cannot distinguish good, honest, well-run companies from 
poorly-managed or dishonest firms (so called ‘lemons’), they refuse to pay a decent price for the 
securities of either. Thus solid firms cannot get investors to buy their stocks and bonds because they 
cannot distinguish themselves, in investors’ minds, from confidence schemes and scam artists.”). 
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system. First, we do not know for sure whether or not we are approaching or 
perhaps past the point of overload for any investors or securities 
professionals, although I have my suspicions that we are. If we decide to 
scale back the disclosure system, determining the right quantity and type of 
information to require companies to disclose is a difficult task, both in terms 
of accommodating the various goals of the federal securities laws and the 
different needs and abilities of users of the information. Notwithstanding 
these challenges, the risk of information overload, and the role of investor 
psychology more generally, should begin to factor into securities regulation 
in a more systematic way.260  
A. The Regulatory Fix 
Even if we are not prepared to scale back disclosure at this point, there are 
at least two steps worth taking now. The first is to collect more empirical 
data.261 At the very least, it is fair to say that the view that investors always 
do better with more information is too simplistic. However, before 
revamping our securities laws to avoid information overload, we need more 
data about how people process information and make investing decisions. 
Without a better understanding of investor behavior, it would be unwise to 
make any significant regulatory changes, since it is hard to predict how 
people will respond. The risk of doing more harm than good by relaxing 
disclosure obligations might be too great, given that the United States already 
has the world’s thickest capital markets. As Herbert Simon put it: “Truly 
complex systems do not lend themselves to summarization in a few laws of 
motion. . . . For real progress, the assemblage of a large and systematic body 
of fact will need to precede the spinning of webs of theory.”262  
Future studies—whether interviews, surveys, laboratory experiments, or 
the study of historical data—can build on the existing behavioral finance 
literature. Two broad inquiries should be pursued. First, what is the 
magnitude of information overload for various securities market participants, 
 260. Professor Langvoort has been one of the leading advocates for factoring investor psychology 
into securities regulation. See, e.g., Langevoort, Market Efficiency Revisited, supra note 20, at 920 
(explaining that we have “gambled on a simplifying theory [rational choice]” in regulating securities 
markets, but that “at some point, the dice will stop rolling, and intellectually, it will be time to settle 
up”); Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126, at 138 (calling for “behavioral securities 
regulation”). 
 261. See also Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126, at 188 (calling for more 
studies of investor behavior). 
 262. Herbert A. Simon, Business Economics, July 1999, at 94 (reviewing HUGH SCHWARTZ, 
RATIONALITY GONE AWRY? DECISION MAKING INCONSISTENT WITH ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
THEORY (1998)). 
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most importantly the expert filters who determine security prices? Second, if 
the mandatory disclosure system is to be scaled back, what information is 
most useful that should be disclosed? Any number of specific questions 
could be studied, including: What information do different investors or 
securities market professionals want? What information do they actually use 
and how? How does an unsophisticated investor select information as 
compared to a securities analyst? Do junior analysts use different decision 
strategies than senior analysts? How does more or less disclosure impact 
investor confidence? How does a person’s capacity to process information 
vary with her expertise? How do the ways people select and process 
information and make decisions respond to more information? Do individual 
investors perform better with training? If so, what kinds of training? It is also 
important to know what information various securities market participants 
find most useful; if mandatory disclosure is scaled back, the SEC needs to 
know what disclosure requirements to delete. Indeed, although we might 
scale back disclosure as a whole, we might find that certain information that 
is not disclosed presently should be. In other words, in addition to disclosing 
less, it might make sense to disclose a different mix of information.  
These and similar questions need to be asked for different types of 
investors and securities professionals and for different decision-making 
settings. This type of work is ongoing in psychology departments, economics 
departments, and business schools around the country, but the SEC and legal 
academics should get more involved in collecting and analyzing data. As a 
useful, and relatively easy, first step, investors, analysts, arbitrageurs, 
brokers, money managers, and others could be surveyed to find out what 
information they use, what information they ignore, what information they 
want, and the like. This is not completely new territory for the SEC, which in 
the past has made some effort at empirical research along the lines suggested 
here, the most notable example being the studies conducted by the Advisory 
Committee on Corporate Disclosure in the 1970s.263  
While we await the data,264 a second step is worth taking. At bottom, 
information overload results when people have difficulty selecting and 
processing information in the face of a complex task involving vast quantities 
of information. The risk of overload can be mitigated, then, by simplifying 
the task at hand. One way to do this, of course, is to reduce the information 
load. Another option is to make the information load, whatever it is, easier to 
 263. See SEC Advisory Committee Report, supra note 15. 
 264. Even after collecting more data, we must be cautious in how we use the data to inform 
policymaking. It is difficult for regulation, which is often blunt and inflexible, to accommodate the 
often narrow, qualified findings of experiments and surveys. 
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evaluate.  
Numerous studies have shown that information overload can be alleviated 
by presenting information in a way that makes it easier to search and process 
the information and easier to make comparisons across choices.265 In other 
words, the presentation of information can be manipulated to improve the 
accuracy and decrease the effort of performing a task by making information 
more accessible and understandable.266 Presentation can also be manipulated, 
for better or for worse, to increase the salience of certain information by 
drawing attention to it267 or to frame how people consider their choices.268 
Experts who study how the presentation of information affects decision 
making typically focus on the form of the information (i.e., numerical, 
verbal, or pictorial, such as graphs or charts), its organization, and the 
sequence of presentation, each of which can have a different impact on 
decision making.269  
The SEC has long focused on the proper formatting and presentation of 
information in SEC filings.270 Some specific examples of past SEC attempts 
 265. See, e.g., Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in Designing Effective Labels for 
Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 1 (1986) [hereinafter Bettman et al., 
Cognitive Considerations]; Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 202; Don N. Kleinmuntz & David A. 
Schkade, Information Displays and Decision Processes, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 2221 (1993); Korobkin, 
supra note 87, at 55-56; David A. Schkade & Don. N. Kleinmuntz, Information Displays and Choice 
Processes: Differential Effects of Organization, Form, and Sequence, 57 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 319 (1994); Morris H. Stocks & Brad Tuttle, An Examination of Information 
Presentation Effects on Financial Distress Predictions, 6 ADVANCES IN ACCT. INFO. SYS. 107 (1998); 
Morgan Swink & Cheri Speier, Presenting Geographic Information: Effects of Data Aggregation, 
Dispersion, and Users’ Spatial Orientation, 30 DECISION SCI. 169 (1999); PAYNE ET AL., supra note 
90, at 48-54, 218-28. For interesting discussions of how the presentation and accounting treatment of 
financial information can affect investor decision making, where investors are modeled as having 
limited attention and processing power, see Kent Daniel et al., Investor Psychology in Capital 
Markets, 49 J. MONET. ECON. 139, 184-90 (2002) [hereinafter Daniel et al.]; Hirshleifer & Teoh, 
supra note 123; Hirshleifer et al., supra note 123; see also Libby et al., Experimental Research in 
Financial Accounting (Feb. 23, 2001), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=261860 
(accessed July 26, 2003) [hereinafter Libby et al.]. 
 266. The Internet is particularly important in this regard. Not only does the Internet allow 
companies to “layer” their disclosures, see infra notes 288-89 and accompanying text, but the Internet 
also makes it easier for people to search information. On the other hand, because of the Internet, 
people are faced with more and more information when making investment decisions.  
 267. See, e.g., Hirshleifer et al., supra note 123, at 5 (describing salience of information as its 
“prominence” or tendency to “stand out”); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING 178-80 (1993) [hereinafter PLOUS]; Kahneman et al., supra note 90, at 192-94. 
 268. See, e.g., 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 180-81 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson 
eds., 3d ed. 1985); PLOUS, supra note 267, at 42; Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 202; Korobkin & 
Ulen, supra note 82, at 1104-07; Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1503-04 (1998); 
PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 48-50, 64-66, 108.  
 269. See, e.g., Kleinmuntz & Schkade, supra note 104. 
 270. Another area where the formatting and presentation of information has received significant 
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to improve how information is presented include the “plain English” 
initiative,271 the increased use of graphs, charts, and tables in executive 
compensation disclosures,272 and recent changes in the format for certain 
investment company disclosures.273 Indeed, the charge to the Task Force on 
Disclosure Simplification in the mid-1990s was to recommend ways to 
simplify disclosure.274 More generally, standardized disclosure formats, such 
as Form 10-Ks or 10-Qs, standardized financial statements, and simplified 
accounting treatment can help reduce search and processing costs.275  
Ultimately, even determining what formatting or presentation changes are 
merited under the federal securities laws is not easy. There is no optimal 
format for every decision or type of information, and individuals might 
respond differently to different presentations of information.276 Questions 
regarding the impact of information presentation on investor behavior could 
be added to the empirical research agenda outlined above. Nonetheless, the 
following suggestions—the details of which remain to be worked out—are 
worth serious consideration and possible adoption presently. 
First, the SEC should continue to require issuers to use more charts, 
graphs, and tables in SEC filings, as the SEC appears to be doing. In its most 
recent rules, the SEC has been sensitive to formatting considerations, in some 
cases proposing that the disclosures be in a graphical or tabular format as 
opposed (or in addition) to narrative discussions.277  
attention is warning labels and products liability, the challenge being to format product warnings that 
consumers will read and can understand. See, e.g., INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO REGULATION 
(Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi eds., 1992); Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations, supra note 
265; Symposium, Rational Actors or Rational Fools? The Implications of Psychology for Products 
Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1 (2000); Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, 
and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1994).  
 271. See supra note 75. 
 272. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.. 
 273. See James A. Fanto, We’re All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and 
Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 171-78 (1998) [hereinafter Fanto]. 
 274. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
 275. A current lightning rod of attention and controversy is how to account for stock options. 
Presently, the details of a company’s stock option grants are contained in the notes to the company’s 
financial statements. Although the information is available for investors, analysts, and others to 
calculate the impact of the options on the company’s bottom line, many worry that this information is 
buried and could be made more accessible if companies were required to expense stock options—in 
effect, taking the information in the notes and putting it on the income statement. For more on how 
accounting treatment can affect the salience of information such as stock option grants and thereby 
affect decision making, see Hirschleifer & Teoh, supra note 123; Stout, An Introduction to the New 
Finance, supra note 128. 
 276. See Bettman et al., supra note 91, at 15 (“No one format is optimal for all types of 
information and/or situations. Rather, processability depends upon the congruence between the format 
and organization of the information and the type of processing to be done.”).  
 
 277. See, e.g., Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangements, Contractual Obligations and Contingent Liabilities and Commitments, Securities Act 
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Second, by requiring that more items be disclosed on Form 8-K, the SEC 
achieves two goals.278 Most notably, it promotes “real-time” disclosure. 
Second, the information disclosed on a Form 8-K might be easier to search 
and process because it is separated out and not disclosed as part of a larger 
filing, where it can be “lost” amid other disclosures or purposefully buried to 
obscure it.279 At some point, of course, the number of periodic reports filed 
might itself become overwhelming for investors if they are continuously 
bombarded with bits and pieces of information and lose a sense of the 
complete picture. Nonetheless, it is worth considering further expanding the 
list of items reported on Form 8-K beyond the new items the SEC has 
proposed for disclosure on Form 8-K.280 More generally, the idea of 
separating out certain key information in quarterly and annual reports is 
worthwhile. The SEC has gone this route when it comes to new MD&A 
disclosure requirements. In its release proposing rules providing for the 
disclosure of certain accounting estimates and critical accounting policies, 
the SEC said:  
The proposals would require that a company present the required 
information in a separate section of MD&A. While the proposed 
disclosure may relate to other aspects of the discussion in MD&A, 
such as the results of operations or liquidity and capital resources, we 
have chosen to separate it both to highlight the discussion and because 
we believe the proposed discussion would present information that is 
better communicated separately to promote understanding.281  
Third, the SEC has said that it is considering requiring that companies 
disclose a summary of MD&A.282 Alan Beller, Director of the Division of 
Corporation Finance at the SEC, has elaborated, suggesting that the summary 
Release No. 33-8144, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,054 (Nov. 4, 2002) (tabular format for aggregate contractual 
obligations; tabular or textual format for contingent liabilities and commitments); Form 8-K 
Disclosure of Certain Management Transactions, Securities Act Release No. 33-8090, 77 SEC Docket 
1072 (Apr. 12, 2002) (soliciting comments regarding tabular format for certain disclosures on Form 8-
K); Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About the Application of Criticual 
Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 33-8098, 77 SEC Docket 1631 (May 10, 2002) 
(separating disclosures regarding a company’s critical accounting policies from the rest of MD&A). 
 278. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. 
 279. Separating out key disclosures, in addition to making it more prominent, might also make it 
more difficult for management to “spin” information.  
 280. See supra note 38. 
 281. Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About the Application of Critical 
Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 33-8098, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,620 (May 10, 2002).  
 282. Id.; see also Alan L. Beller, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities & 
Exchange Commission, Remarks before the Rocky Mountain Securities Conference (May 17, 2002) 
[hereinafter Beller, Remarks]. 
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could give a “concise, clear presentation of management’s views of how the 
company makes money; what is most important in understanding the 
company’s financial reporting; what financial, operational, macroeconomic 
or other trends management pays most attention to; and what seems most 
likely to management to spoil the party going forward.”283 Beller is also 
reported to have said: “Current MD&A goes on endlessly about stuff that 
investors can find in the balance sheet. They don’t need 10 pages of elevator 
music.”284 Given the importance of MD&A to investors, making it more 
accessible is a good idea. The summary would not replace the full MD&A, 
which would continue to be required. One could certainly imagine, though, 
disclosures where the summary MD&A contains a hyperlink to the more 
extensive discussion for those who are interested. The SEC should seriously 
consider this and other efforts to summarize disclosures.285  
Fourth, the SEC should consider tiered financial reporting, requiring 
summary financial statements in addition to a company’s complete financial 
statements.286 In the United Kingdom, companies are permitted to send 
shareholders summary financial statements.287 Financial statements, 
especially when the notes are considered, are voluminous and difficult to 
wade through. Issuers could be required to summarize certain key financial 
information using charts and tables, possibly showing company trends for a 
three-, five-, or ten-year period. Again, the summary information could be 
hyperlinked to more detailed information, or the summary could be inserted 
in the company’s 10-Q or 10-K along with its full financial statements. A 
recent study by Blunn & Company reports that companies who put their 
annual reports online are increasingly linking line items to related notes, 
making it easier for investors to search and use a company’s financial 
disclosures, whereas other companies put a summary of key financial 
 283. Beller, Remarks, supra note 282. 
 284. Market Fears Levy Long-Term Fixes: Voluntary Action Now Will Keep Companies Ahead of 
the Curve, INVESTOR REL. BUS., June 17, 2002, at 1. 
 285. There is no reason to limit summaries to MD&A. The SEC, for example, could consider a 
new “Highlights” disclosure requirement, summarizing the key information in the company’s Form 
10-Q or 10-K, along the lines of the “Key Facts” document proposed in the United Kingdom, see Sara 
Calian, Top 10 Recommendations for a Simplified Prospectus, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 14, 2003, at 
http://online.wsj.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2003), or the “profile prospectus” available for mutual 
funds, see New Disclosure for Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-7513, 66 SEC Docket 1703 (Mar. 13, 1998). 
 286. For a formal treatment of two-tiered financial reporting, see Robert M. Bushman et al., A 
Model of Two-Tiered Financial Reporting, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 51 (1996). 
 287. For more on the United Kingdom’s use of summary financial statements, see KATHARINE 
BAGSHAW, SUMMARY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: A GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICE (1999); Katharine 
Bagshaw, Summary Financial Statements: Cost-Effective Communication, 78 MGMT. ACCT. 52 
(2000). 
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information online.288 Discussing the possibility of a tiered system of 
financial disclosure along the lines suggested here, then-SEC Chairman 
Harvey Pitt said: 
First, we believe investors would benefit if companies could produce 
clear and concise financial statements. This would not be an initiative 
to “dumb down” or omit the complete picture that current financial 
statements are intended to provide. Rather, it would be an effort to 
give companies the flexibility to produce and disclose financial 
information in “layers” ranging from those with a general “big 
picture” focus to those that encompass the minutest detail, all of which 
would be readily accessible to investors electronically. This would 
permit investors to “drill down” to whatever layer they wish. The 
layers would allow companies to explain financial statement 
disclosure to investors in ways that are more clear, concise and 
understandable.289 
It is worth noting that we already aggregate financial information; we 
give investors a balance sheet, income statement, and statement of cash flow, 
and not raw data. In this sense, summary financial statements are not a new 
concept; they are just more aggregation than is presently done. Moreover, 
precedent for summarizing financial disclosures can be found in the SEC’s 
earlier experience with summary annual reports.290 Indeed, in 1995 the SEC 
issued a rule proposal regarding the use of abbreviated financial 
statements.291 
Finally, studies show that training and education can lead to better 
decision making by enabling people to process more information effectively, 
by helping people learn what information to ignore, and by giving people a 
wider array of decision strategies to employ in diverse settings.292 Regardless 
of the quantity of information and its format, education and training might 
promote informed investor decision making. Relevant education and training 
might include teaching investors everything from basic valuation to how to 
 288. Dominic Jones, New Trends in Online Annual Reports, at http://www.irwebreport.com/ 
features/030101.htm. 
 289. Pitt, Written Testimony, supra note 16, at 12-13. 
 290. For a discussion of the summary annual report, see J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Stephen M. 
DeTore, Rationalizing the Disclosure Process: The Summary Annual Report, 39 CASE W. REV. L. 
REV. 39 (1989); Charles Lee & Dale Morse, Summary Annual Reports, 4 ACCT. HORIZONS 39 (1990). 
 291. Use of Abbreviated Financial Statements, Securities Act Release No. 33-7183, 59 SEC 
Docket 1556 (June 27, 1995). 
 292. See generally Sarah E. Bonner et al., Using Decision Aids to Improve Auditors’ Conditional 
Probability Judgments, 71 ACCT. REV. 221 (1996) [hereinafter Bonner et al.]; PAYNE ET AL., supra 
note 90, at 235-39.  
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read financial statements, and from how to understand basic macroeconomic 
factors to how stock exchanges operate. Further, studies show that decision 
aids, from basic checklists to computer models, can also help people process 
information and make better decisions.293 A simple checklist, for example, 
can help formalize the decision-making process and facilitate the evaluation 
of information and the comparison of choices across a number of factors.294 
The SEC has already initiated a number of investor education programs.295 
The town hall meetings held by former SEC Chairman Levitt perhaps 
received the most attention recently. The SEC should consider additional 
investor education programs that it could institute.  
B. Some Thoughts on the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis  
A full consideration of the implications of information overload for the 
efficient capital market hypothesis is beyond this Article’s scope, although a 
few thoughts are in order. The efficient capital market hypothesis is well 
known, so I can quickly summarize it.296 According to the ECMH, security 
prices fully reflect all available information. New information is rapidly 
incorporated into security prices by the active trading of investors, so that 
security prices always reflect informed investors’ best guess of a company’s 
value.297 As a result, investors cannot expect to earn abnormal returns by 
buying or selling securities on the basis of new information, unless they are 
among the first to trade on it. Some assert that capital markets are not only 
informationally efficient, but also “fundamentally” efficient in that a 
company’s stock price reflects the company’s fundamental value.298  
 293. See, e.g., Bonner et al., supra note 292; PAYNE ET AL., supra note 90, at 220, 228-35, 237-38 
(discussing how decision aids and computer models can increase a person’s capacity to process 
information); Zacharakis & Meyer, supra note 123, at 340 (explaining data showing that decision aids, 
including simple checklists, improve venture capital decision making). 
 294. Zacharakis & Meyer, supra note 123, at 340. 
 295. For a summary of SEC investor education initiatives, see Fanto, supra note 273, at 156-79. 
Professor Fanto also urges the SEC to adopt more of these initiatives. Id. at 107-08, 178. 
 296. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text; see also RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART 
C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 345-70 (7th ed., 2003); Lawrence Cunningham, 
From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994); Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 20; Kahan, supra 
note 15; Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and 
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995) [hereinafter Stout, Costly Casinos]. 
 297. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 565-92 (describing mechanisms of market efficiency); 
Gordon & Kornhauer, supra note 20, at 770; Langevoort, Information Technology, supra note 15, at 
778-79; SHLEIFER, supra note 126, at 2, 4. 
 298. For summaries of the fundamental efficiency view, see Langevoort, Taming the Animal 
Spirits, supra note 126, at 140-43; Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 296, at 617; Stout, An 
Introduction to the New Finance, supra note 128, at 6-14. Professor Stout has argued that investors 
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The ECMH generally assumes that investors are rational, meaning that 
investors accurately value a company’s securities, and that the costs of 
searching and processing information are low.299 To the extent that investors 
make mistakes in valuing securities, the errors are said to be random and 
therefore to cancel each other out.300 To the extent that securities remain 
mispriced, the buying and selling by arbitrageurs brings security prices in 
line with fundamental value. Accordingly, any (significant) deviations 
between security prices and fundamental value will not be prolonged.  
The ECMH generally does not account for how people actually search 
and process information or make decisions, but instead assumes rationality. 
Numerous studies, however, have found significant “noise” in capital 
markets and that investors and securities market professionals deviate from 
perfectly rational behavior.301 Some of the most well-known sources of these 
deviations from rationality include loss aversion, framing, the 
representativeness heuristic, the availability heuristic, overoptimism, and 
overconfidence.302 These findings are significant because they suggest that 
investors, analysts, and others process information imperfectly, and in many 
cases, the errors are not random and therefore do not necessarily cancel each 
other out. Consequently, a significant divergence between security prices and 
fundamental value can develop. The ability to arbitrage away the wedge 
between security prices and fundamental value in fact is limited, contrary to a 
key tenet of the ECMH.303 (One limit on arbitrage might be information 
have heterogenous expectations (i.e., they value securities differently), contrary to a key assumption of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Accordingly, Stout concludes that even if investors are rational, 
security prices may diverge from fundamental value. See Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 296; Lynn 
A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 
99 YALE L.J. 1235 (1990). Fischer Black has generously described markets as being efficient 
whenever security prices are within a factor of two of value. See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 
533 (1985).  
 299. For other assumptions of the ECMH, see Fama, supra note 19, at 387-388; Gordon & 
Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 770-71 (summarizing the conditions under which capital markets will be 
efficient as “no transaction costs in trading securities, costless access by all market participants to all 
available information, and agreement by market participants as to implications of such information for 
the current price and distributions of future price of each security”); SHLEIFER, supra note 126, at 2. In 
their important article on the ECMH, Gilson and Kraakman point out that information costs (e.g., the 
cost of acquiring, verifying, and processing information), if high enough, impede market efficiency. 
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 592-609; see also Stout, An Introduction to the New Finance, 
supra note 128, at 15 (discussing the information costs Gilson and Kraakman identify). 
 300. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 581; SHLEIFER, supra note 126, at 2.  
 301. See, e.g., Fisher & Statman, supra note 170; Hirshleifer, supra note 126; Langevoort, Market 
Efficiency Revisited, supra note 20; Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 126; Prentice, 
supra note 125; SHILLER, supra note 126; SHLEIFER, supra note 126; Raghubir & Das, supra note 170. 
 302. See supra notes 125-26. 
 303. See Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits, supra note 128, at 148-50; SHLEIFER, supra note 
126, at 13, 87-111; Stout, An Introduction to the New Finance, supra note 128, at 5; cf. supra notes 
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overload—there simply might be too many companies to follow and too 
much information to digest for arbitrageurs to scour each corner of the 
market searching for arbitrage opportunities.) 
Information overload is part of this investor-psychology-based critique of 
the ECMH. Information overload raises doubts about two key features of the 
ECMH: first, that all information is reflected in stock prices; and second, that 
the information is correctly interpreted.304 
First, it is not certain that all available information is reflected in security 
prices, as the ECMH claims. As a result of information overload, individual 
investors, securities analysts, money managers, and others might not consider 
all relevant information in making investment decisions.305 Which 
information is considered will depend, in part, on which decision strategy an 
individual uses and what information an individual ignores or overlooks in 
evaluating securities. Different individuals will focus on different 
information. (This would be true even if each person used a similar decision 
strategy and there was no information overload.306) If key information is not 
used, not only are capital markets not informationally efficient, but security 
prices will not reflect fundamental value. So as not to overstate the concern, 
it is important to note that if “enough” investors and market professionals 
consider each item of (material) information, the information can be 
incorporated in security prices; the ECMH does not depend on each 
individual considering each piece of information. Accordingly, information 
overload, at least insofar as its implications for market efficiency are 
concerned, should be less of a concern for a stock like Microsoft, which is 
covered by several analysts and which trades actively, than for a small cap 
stock that trades over the counter and has little, if any, analyst coverage.  
Second, there is no guarantee that investors, analysts, or other securities 
159-93 and accompanying text (describing the imperfect rationality of experts). 
 304. Professor Schwarcz makes a similar point, arguing that the capital markets are not efficient 
with respect to disclosures about particularly complex transactions, which neither lay investors, nor the 
expert filters, can adequately interpret. See Schwarcz, supra note 134; see also Stout, An Introduction 
to the New Finance, supra note 128, at 3 (describing as the “Achilles heel of efficient market theory—
the puzzle of how, exactly, information flows into prices”). The extent to which information overload 
has these effects depends on the degree to which the expert filters, the “mechanisms of market 
efficiency” that Gilson and Kraakman refer to, whose trades incorporate information into and set 
security prices, are overloaded. See supra notes 159-93 and accompanying text; Gilson & Kraakman, 
supra note 19, at 565-92, 613-22.  
 305. See supra Parts III.C and IV.A. 
 306. Professor Stout describes the heterogeneous expectations of investors as follows: “Different 
investors are likely to face different costs in obtaining and using different subsets of information 
relevant to stock values. An accountant may find it easiest to gauge a coffee company’s prospects 
according to its financial statements, whereas a gourmand who hates numbers may judge the firm by 
the taste of its product.” Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 296, at 626 (citations omitted). 
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market participants will accurately process whatever information they do 
consider.307 For example, if individuals are subject to information overload, 
there is reason to believe that they will not accurately interpret the available 
information. Thus, even the information that is fully reflected in security 
prices might not be reflected correctly.308 In other words, even if capital 
markets are informationally efficient with respect to a piece of information, 
they might not be fundamentally efficient. On the other hand, if “enough” 
market participants correctly process the information, the concern that 
investors will misinterpret it is mitigated. Furthermore, it is not clear that 
information overload leads to the kind of systematic biases often associated 
with behavioral finance. For example, not every investor has the same point 
of overload, and not every investor will adopt the same decision strategy in 
each setting. Accordingly, to the extent that information overload leads to 
errors in how people evaluate information and value companies, the errors 
might be random and largely cancel each other out. That having been said, if 
people adopt similar decision strategies and focus on similar information, we 
might expect them to make similar mistakes. In general, the decision-making 
errors resulting from information overload could be substantial, especially if 
wide segments of the market are overloaded. To the extent that pricing errors 
do not cancel each other out, the limits of arbitrage to ensure fundamental 
efficiency will be further tested, and we can expect information overload to 
result in a greater degree of persistent mispricing. At the very least, the 
transaction costs of the trading necessary to bring security prices in line with 
fundamental value could be significant.  
Before drawing any firm conclusions about the impact of information 
overload on security prices and market efficiency, we need more data. We 
need more data about how people search and process information and make 
decisions, and we need more data about how information is incorporated into 
security prices.309 As Professors Gordon and Kornhauser put it: “[The 
ECMH] should be embedded in a general model that simultaneously explains 
both investors’ decisions to acquire information and the process of market 
aggregation of information held by investors.”310 Extensive studies show 
sustained mispricings and inefficiencies in capital markets, although more 
 307. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 19, at 594 (discussing the cost of processing 
information). 
 308. It is important to note that information overload is not the only reason people might make 
mistakes processing information. Valuing securities requires a person to consider a wide array of 
information about a company, its industry, and macroeconomic conditions. Any time a person, even an 
expert, attempts to make a complex decision under uncertainty, there is an opportunity for error.  
 309. SHLEIFER, supra note 126, at 27 (explaining that behavioral finance is “still in its infancy”). 
 310. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 20, at 787. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p417 Paredes book pages.doc10/27/03   10:34 AM 
 
 
 
 
 
484 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:417 
 
 
 
 
 
empirical and theoretical finance work is needed looking specifically at the 
effects of information overload.311 
The tentative suggestion of information overload, though, is provocative. 
Capital markets might be more, not less, informationally efficient and 
fundamentally efficient if less, not more, information is available. 
Information overload, along with the entire field of behavioral finance, could 
have important implications for how we regulate capital markets, perhaps 
first and foremost by raising questions about those features of securities 
regulation premised on the ECMH.312 Even proponents of the ECMH realize 
that it is not “strictly valid.”313 Nonetheless, it is too early to eulogize the 
ECMH. Given the apparent indeterminacy of investor psychology, the 
ECMH might be the most accurate model we have, at least for the time 
being; and even when investor psychology is fully factored in, capital 
markets might turn out to be efficient enough to continue as a useful basis for 
policymaking.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
One of the key pillars undergirding the federal securities laws—that 
investors effectively process information—is under pressure. An extensive 
literature shows that investors and other securities market participants are 
subject to cognitive biases and, because of bounded rationality, adopt 
heuristics in making investment decisions. My focus here has been on the 
risk of information overload—the risk that investors will actually make less 
accurate decisions in the face of more information as they adopt less 
complicated decision strategies in an effort to simplify their investment 
decisions. I have tried to provide a framework for thinking about information 
overload and how it fits within the overall structure of securities regulation. 
At bottom, information overload raises doubts about the effectiveness of the 
disclosure philosophy at the core of the federal securities laws. Investors 
might be better off if the mandatory disclosure system were scaled back by 
deleting certain disclosure requirements. Solving information overload is not 
just about deleting trivial disclosure items, however. Some material 
disclosures might be worth putting on the chopping block too.  
My conclusions and policy prescriptions are tentative, given the state of 
our understanding of investor psychology and decision making. A number of 
 311. See, e.g., Daniel et al., supra note 265; Hirshleifer & Teoh, supra note 123; Hirschleifer et 
al., supra note 123; Libby et al., supra note 265; see also supra note 126. 
 312. See supra notes 18-20. 
 313. Fama, supra note 19, at 410. 
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concerns would admittedly need to be addressed before revamping the 
federal mandatory disclosure regime to require less disclosure. For example, 
what disclosure items should be deleted? To which market participants 
should disclosure be tailored? What message would scaling back the 
disclosure system send to investors? How would investor confidence be 
impacted? What about the role of disclosure in reducing agency costs? And, 
perhaps most important, are investors overloaded and, if so, what about the 
expert filters? Nonetheless, I have two suggestions. First, the SEC and others 
should collect additional empirical data so that we have a better 
understanding of investor behavior and can more effectively factor how 
investors and securities market professionals really act and behave into 
securities regulation. We know that investors, as well as the expert filters, are 
not perfectly rational, but we do not know enough about how people actually 
behave to justify changing the federal securities laws significantly. Second, 
the SEC should continue requiring companies to present information in a 
way that makes it more accessible and easier to process. I am not sure any 
other regulatory steps are warranted now in response to the risk of 
information overload or behavioral finance more generally. 
The most important point to take away from this Article is that securities 
regulation needs to focus to a greater extent on the user of information. For 
the federal mandatory disclosure system—or any disclosure-based regulatory 
regime—to work effectively, regulators and policy makers need to focus on 
how users process information and make decisions. In short, investor 
psychology matters. It is not enough to require more and more disclosure 
without more carefully considering how the information is used by investors, 
analysts, brokers, arbitrageurs, and other market participants. My goal is not 
to suggest that we scrap the mandatory disclosure system. Rather, my goal is 
to suggest possibilities for getting the most out of the federal securities laws. 
It might be that we get more out of disclosure with less of it. 
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